Court Filings

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s termination of spousal support. Patricia (wife) appealed after the Summit County trial court adopted a magistrate’s decision that ended Richard’s (husband) indefinite spousal support. The appellate court held the divorce decree only reserved the trial court authority to terminate support on death or the wife’s remarriage, and to modify support upon a substantial change in circumstances; it did not reserve authority to terminate support based on a change in circumstances. Because the termination exceeded the decree’s reserved powers, the trial court abused its discretion and the judgment was reversed.

The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed a circuit court order that awarded the father attorney’s fees as sanctions against the mother in a paternity case. The trial court granted the mother’s counsel leave to withdraw and conditioned a continuance on the mother paying the father’s fees for attending the hearing. The appellate court held the mother was not given notice that sanctions would be considered nor an opportunity to present evidence, violating due process, and therefore the sanctions award must be reversed. Because that reversal resolves the main issue, the court did not reach the remaining arguments.

The Appellate Division, First Department, reviewed a Family Court order entered after the mother defaulted at a fact-finding hearing in a neglect proceeding concerning her child. Because the mother's attorney, after consulting with the absent mother, declined to contest the allegations at the final hearing, the court held that no appeal lies from an order entered on default and dismissed the appeal of the neglect finding. The court nevertheless reviewed and affirmed the denial of the mother's request for an adjournment, finding no abuse of discretion given the repeated prior adjournments, adequate notice, and the mother's choice to travel instead of attending the hearing.

The Appellate Division modified a Family Court order concerning custody-related communications and confidentiality after a hearing. The court vacated the requirement that the mother disclose her residential address to the father and remanded for a hearing on the mother's pending request for address confidentiality. It also vacated the provision allowing the father to communicate with and participate in the child’s therapy, remanding for further proceedings (including possible independent evaluation or preparatory therapy). The court allowed limited indirect contact (cards/gifts/letters) but required those communications be reviewed by the attorney for the child and routed through that office while confidentiality is pending.

The Ohio Sixth District Court of Appeals affirmed the Lucas County Domestic Relations Court’s September 17, 2025 judgments. The appeal arose from post-divorce proceedings in which the magistrate and trial court addressed modification of parenting time, contempt findings related to court-ordered counseling, and related motions. The appellate court held it lacked jurisdiction to consider two earlier trial-court orders because Dawn did not timely appeal them, and it lacked a record (transcripts) to review factual challenges. Because Dawn failed to file transcript evidence, the court presumed regularity of the proceedings and found no reversible error, affirming the trial court.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Jennifer Daugherty’s direct appeal of a trial court contempt order against Matthew Woodard for failure to follow the required discretionary-appeal procedure for domestic relations matters. The appellate court explained that orders holding or declining to hold someone in contempt in a domestic relations case must be reviewed by application for discretionary appeal under OCGA § 5-6-35, and that compliance with that procedure is jurisdictional. Because Daugherty filed a direct appeal instead of an application for discretionary appeal, the Court of Appeals concluded it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal.

The Appellate Division reversed the Family Part's May 19, 2025 order that dismissed a temporary restraining order and denied a final restraining order (FRO) after a college student (plaintiff) proved defendant committed an acquaintance rape that included manual strangulation. The trial court credited the victim but denied an FRO based largely on lack of prior domestic violence between the parties and instead admonished the defendant informally. The appellate court held that the extreme physical force—sexual assault plus strangulation—was sufficiently egregious to require an FRO and that the court improperly downplayed the victim's best interests and the risk of future abuse.

The Ohio appellate court affirmed the juvenile court’s July 21, 2025 order granting permanent custody of infant C.C. to the Defiance-Paulding Department of Job and Family Services. The child was placed in the agency’s temporary custody shortly after birth in June 2023 because both parents were incarcerated. After nearly two years in foster care, the agency sought permanent custody. The court found the child had been in temporary custody for 12 of the prior 22 months, the parents (particularly the mother) failed to complete case-plan goals, and the child’s best interests favored permanency with the foster family.

The Ohio Third District Court of Appeals affirmed the Shelby County Common Pleas Court’s grant of a domestic violence civil protection order (DVCPO) in favor of petitioner Jamie Chambers against respondent Matthew Chambers. The DVCPO followed a full hearing at which Jamie testified to multiple incidents of physical abuse, threats including possession of a gun, and post-separation stalking; a corroborating witness (Matthew’s sister-in-law) also testified. The magistrate credited Jamie’s testimony, and the trial court adopted the magistrate’s decision. The appeals court held there was competent, credible evidence to support the DVCPO and rejected challenges about excluded post-hearing exhibits and sufficiency of corroborating records.

The Ohio Eleventh District Court of Appeals affirmed the juvenile court’s denial of Benjamin Ward’s contempt motion and the trial court’s overruling of his objections. Ward had sought contempt against Heather Morgan for allegedly denying his scheduled companionship with their daughter during Thanksgiving 2023, spring break 2024, and the first six weeks of summer 2024 under a November 2023 judgment entry. The magistrate found conflicting testimony and determined Morgan did not willfully violate the order, in part because Ward did not arrange or pay for the child’s transportation to Ohio as the entry required. The trial court adopted that decision and the appellate court found no abuse of discretion.

The Georgia Court of Appeals granted Che Fluellen's application for discretionary appeal in a child-custody or dependency matter involving the Georgia Department of Human Services on May 4, 2026. The court authorized filing a Notice of Appeal within ten days of the order and directed the Superior Court clerk to include this order in the record transmitted to the Court of Appeals. No merits decision was made; the order simply allows the appeal to proceed and instructs preparation of the appellate record.

The Court of Appeal reviewed postdissolution litigation between former spouses Mizuki Nishida (appellant) and Masashi Kamoda (respondent). Nishida sued in civil court alleging Kamoda fraudulently induced her to accept a postjudgment stipulation dividing a retirement asset. The civil court transferred the case to family law court, which dismissed it as untimely under Family Code section 2122 and denied leave to amend. The appellate court reversed those rulings and remanded, concluding Nishida timely filed within the one-year discovery period, transfer cured any jurisdictional defect, and leave to amend should have been granted. The court affirmed the civil court’s grant of relief from default to Kamoda.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department reversed a Family Court order that had required petitioner Tamra J. Werner to pay respondent Kraig H. Kenney $18,000 in legal fees and expenses and to pay a $250 fine. The appeal challenged a December 17, 2024 Family Court decision in a proceeding under Family Court Act article 6. The appellate court unanimously found error in law and vacated both the monetary award and the fine, remanding nothing and awarding no costs.

The Appellate Division affirmed Family Court’s denial of the mother’s petition for sole custody, concluding the court carefully weighed the custody factors and found most favored the father given a long-standing custodial arrangement and extensive evidence of parental alienation by the mother. However, the appellate court held that Family Court lacked jurisdiction to find the mother in civil contempt and to impose sanctions because the father’s cross-claim and subsequent order to show cause failed to comply with the notice and warning requirements of Judiciary Law § 756. The contempt finding and sanction were vacated and the separate contempt order was reversed.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department reversed Family Court's dismissal of a mother's petition to relocate to Arkansas with her child. The court found new information — the mother married a fiancé who lives in Arkansas and the father had not exercised visitation for 16 months — made the existing record insufficient to decide the child's best interests. The appellate court reinstated the mother's petition and remitted the case to Family Court for an expedited hearing and a fresh best-interests determination.

The Appellate Division dismissed most of an appeal by the child’s mother challenging a Family Court order that had awarded sole custody and primary residence to a nonrelative petitioner. The appeal was rendered moot after the child stopped living with the petitioner and the mother and the child's maternal aunt later agreed to an order for joint custody and shared residence. The court nonetheless reviewed and affirmed Family Court’s separate finding that extraordinary circumstances existed to justify awarding custody to the petitioner, endorsing the lower court's reasoning.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department dismissed the father's appeal from a Family Court order that modified a prior custody arrangement and set parenting time. The court concluded the father had received the substantive relief he sought—including the equal parenting time requested—so he was not an aggrieved party and therefore lacked appellate standing. Because the appeal raised no reviewable grievance, the court unanimously dismissed the appeal without costs.

The Appellate Division reversed a Family Court order that declared petitioners Mary B.L. and Robert A.L. to be the sole legal parents of two children born via surrogacy and ordered their immediate custody transfer. The court found both surrogacy agreements unenforceable under Family Court Act article 5-C (one unsigned by Robert; the other executed after embryo transfer), so the statute required the court to decide parentage based on party intent while also considering the children's best interests. Because Family Court refused a hearing and did not adequately consider best interests, the matter is sent back for an immediate hearing.

The Ohio Court of Appeals reviewed a domestic relations case in which Beth Saari and Joshua Fieweger divorced and the trial court divided marital assets, including complex stock awards and bank accounts, and resolved temporary spousal support and alleged financial misconduct. The appellate court affirmed most rulings (including findings about unvested awards, temporary support termination, and financial-misconduct remedies) but reversed in part and remanded. The court found the trial court failed to adequately explain an unequal distributive award, misallocated value for a Computershare account (duplicative of Fidelity holdings), and left unclear its valuation and treatment of newly vested stock/options, requiring clarification on remand.

The Ohio Sixth District Court of Appeals affirmed the juvenile court’s orders removing two children from their mother after she was found unconscious following a suspected drug overdose while the children were in the home. The agency filed dependency complaints and obtained emergency shelter care; the juvenile court adjudicated the children dependent, placed them in relatives’ temporary custody, and limited mother to supervised visitation while ordering substance abuse and mental health assessments. The appellate court held the record (bodycam, officer and caseworker testimony, and mother’s refusal to acknowledge drug use) supported removal, dependency adjudication by clear and convincing evidence, and supervised visitation as in the children’s best interests.

The Fifth District reversed and remanded a Seminole County dissolution case because the trial court summarily denied the former husband’s timely motion to vacate a magistrate’s recommended order solely for not providing all trial transcripts. The appellate court held that the rule requires submission of a record or notice of a partial record but also contemplates substantial compliance and a mandatory hearing on a timely motion to vacate. Because the court cancelled the hearing and denied the motion without assessing substantial compliance or allowing the hearing, the denial was reversible error and the case is sent back for further proceedings.

The Sixth District Court of Appeal reversed a trial-court order awarding attorney’s fees to Meagan Garmon in a post-dissolution proceeding and also reversed the denial of Jason Garmon’s rehearing request. The appeals court held that the record lacked competent, substantial evidence demonstrating Former Wife’s need for fee awards. Because the trial court’s finding of need was unsupported, the appellate court reversed the fee award, relying on Florida precedent requiring competent evidence of need before awarding attorney’s fees in family-law matters.

The Court of Appeals abated this appeal of a final divorce decree and sent the case back to the trial court so it can reconsider a wife’s motion to modify temporary orders entered during the appeal. The trial court previously entered temporary orders in July 2025, reserved other relief pending mediation, and later held a hearing on the wife’s motion to modify seeking child support, attorneys’ fees, security for any stayed property division, and other relief. The appeals court concluded the trial court retains jurisdiction to modify temporary orders under Family Code §109.001(b-3)–(b-4) and ordered the parties to report back by June 1, 2026.

The Court of Appeals reviewed two Williamson County district court orders: (1) denying Luke Dillon’s petition to modify the parent-child relationship, and (2) granting in part and denying in part his motion to enforce their 2019 agreed divorce decree. The court held that Dillon failed to prove a material and substantial change in circumstances to justify the conservatorship changes he sought, but the trial court abused its discretion by granting two conservatorship modifications (exclusive psychiatric-consent to Bamford and mandatory therapist-determined therapy frequency). On enforcement, the court found Bamford improperly claimed the children in 2019 and awarded Dillon $8,774, but affirmed denial of relief for alleged 2021 tax harms.

The First District of Texas dismissed Mother’s appeal of the trial court’s temporary orders in a suit to modify the parent-child relationship for lack of jurisdiction. The court explained it may only hear final judgments or interlocutory orders that statutes specifically allow, and temporary orders in modification suits are not appealable interlocutory orders. The opinion noted such orders may be challenged by mandamus but not by interlocutory appeal, granted Father’s motion to dismiss, and dismissed other pending motions as moot.

The court dismissed Mother’s appeal from a trial court’s “Order for Mediation with Dispute Resolution” for lack of jurisdiction. The appellate court warned Mother that the order did not appear to be a final judgment or an otherwise appealable interlocutory order and gave her until a deadline to show grounds to continue the appeal. No response was filed, and the clerk confirmed the trial judge had not signed a final judgment and the case remains pending. Because appeals generally lie only from final judgments or statutorily authorized interlocutory orders, the court dismissed the appeal.

The Second Court of Appeals (Fort Worth) affirmed the trial court’s termination of J.J. (Father) and L.R. (Mother) as to their daughter D.J. after a two-day bench trial. The court found clear and convincing evidence supporting endangerment-based predicate grounds and that termination was in the child’s best interest; Mother’s parental rights were also terminated based on a prior termination as to another child. Father’s counsel filed an Anders brief and the court concluded his appeal was frivolous. The appellate court reviewed credibility, drug-use evidence, parental instability, and the parents’ failure to comply with court-ordered drug testing as central to its decision.

The court dismissed an appeal in a child-protection case because the appellant failed to file the required appellate brief. The brief was due March 13, 2026; the court notified the appellant of the deficiency on March 24 and gave a deadline of April 6 to file the brief and a motion explaining the delay. The appellant did not respond, so the court dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution under the Texas appellate rules.

The Texas Court of Appeals granted Mother’s petition for writ of mandamus because the trial court improperly heard and entered temporary orders on Father’s petition to modify the parent–child relationship without complying with Texas Family Code §156.102. The court held Father filed his petition within one year of the prior custody rendition, triggering the affidavit requirement; the trial court had found Father’s affidavit insufficient but nevertheless proceeded to a hearing. The appellate court concluded the trial court abused its discretion, ordered the temporary order vacated, and directed the trial court to deny Father’s petition.

The Court of Appeals affirmed a divorce decree entered after a May 7, 2025 final hearing. Richardson argued the court lacked proper notice, admitted exhibits and decided the case without live testimony, considered a late amended petition, awarded relief not pleaded, and failed to issue proper findings. The court held Richardson had agreed to try the matter on May 7 and to submit evidence rather than take live testimony, so there was no Rule 245 notice or due-process violation. Exhibits were offered in open court, objections were overruled, and any amendment or pleading defects were waived or not shown to be prejudicial. The judgment was affirmed.