Court Filings

The Third District Court of Appeal dismissed J.L.'s petition for writ of certiorari challenging the trial court’s denial of his pretrial motion in limine to exclude certain records. The appellate court concluded it lacked jurisdiction because the petitioner did not show irreparable harm that could not be remedied on appeal from a final judgment. The court relied on precedent holding that rulings on motions in limine that exclude or admit evidence ordinarily can be corrected on direct appeal, so interlocutory certiorari review is inappropriate absent a showing of irreparable harm.

The Ohio Court of Appeals dismissed Michael-Rashaad Williamson’s original action seeking a writ of prohibition against the City of Toledo, its police department, the Toledo Municipal Court prosecutor, and an IRS commissioner. The court explained that a writ of prohibition may only be issued against persons exercising judicial or quasi-judicial power, and prosecutors and police do not qualify. Because the named respondents do not exercise the required judicial authority and the complaint sought dismissal and expungement of a pending criminal case, the relator cannot prevail and the writ was denied as a matter of law.

The Georgia Court of Appeals granted Shakka Shaneak James's application for discretionary appeal from a superior court order that denied her request to file a pro se mandamus petition under OCGA § 9-15-2(d). The Court concluded the superior court’s denial is subject to direct appeal under state appellate statutes, so James may proceed by filing a notice of appeal. The Court directed the superior court clerk to include this order in the record and gave James ten days from this order to file a notice of appeal if she has not already done so.

The Tenth District Court of Appeals denied Ramone Wright’s request for a writ of mandamus seeking reversal of an indictment in Franklin County Common Pleas case No. 09CR-3758. The court adopted the magistrate’s decision and granted the municipal court respondent’s motion to dismiss under Civ.R. 12(B)(6). The dismissal was based on procedural defects: Wright failed to submit a notarized affidavit of prior civil filings as required by R.C. 2969.25(A) and the affidavit he did file omitted multiple civil actions and appeals from the prior five years. Because compliance with R.C. 2969.25 is mandatory, the petition was dismissed without reaching the merits.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, per curiam, entered an order on May 5, 2026 quashing the appellant Michael E. Keeling’s notice of appeal. The court cited Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 910(a)(5) concerning the court’s consideration of issues limited to those set forth in the statement of questions presented. The order is short and disposes of the appeal by dismissing the procedural vehicle rather than reaching the merits.

The Florida First District Court of Appeal reviewed an appeal by Emerson Ware from a circuit court decision involving the Department of Corrections. The appellate court issued a short per curiam decision on May 5, 2026, simply stating the judgment was affirmed. No substantive opinion or reasoning was provided in the published entry; the judges concurred and the panel noted the appeal is not final until any timely motions under the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure are resolved.

The First District Court of Appeal reviewed Martin Peterson's appeal of a decision entered by the Leon County Circuit Court involving the Florida Department of Corrections. The appellate panel issued a short per curiam opinion on May 5, 2026, unanimously concluding that the lower court's judgment should be upheld. The opinion contains a single-line disposition, affirming the circuit court's ruling, with all three judges concurring. No additional reasoning or factual background is provided in the published entry.

The Florida First District Court of Appeal denied David Nathaniel Reese’s petition for a writ of mandamus seeking relief against the Attorney General and the Department of Children and Families. The court considered an original petition filed by Reese and, without published opinion or extended explanation, entered a per curiam order denying the request. The denial leaves in place the lower-court or administrative course of action that Reese sought to change and provides no relief from the challenged decision or duty he asked the court to compel.

The Florida First District Court of Appeal dismissed William Fountain Jr.'s petition for a writ of belated appeal. The court issued a brief per curiam order on May 5, 2026, concluding the petition did not warrant relief. No opinion explaining the reasoning was provided, and the dismissal is subject to any timely rule-based motions for rehearing or other authorized post-decision filings.

The Florida First District Court of Appeal reviewed an appeal by Anthony Jerome Cooper from a Leon County circuit court judgment involving the Florida Department of Corrections. The court issued a short per curiam opinion on May 5, 2026, announcing the decision to affirm the lower court's ruling. No opinion text explaining the court's reasoning is provided in the published entry; the disposition simply states AFFIRMED with three judges concurring and notes the decision is not final until any timely motions are resolved.

The First District Court of Appeal dismissed Shamar Christian’s petition for a writ of certiorari directed at the State of Florida. The opinion is per curiam and contains no published reasoning; the court simply entered an order dismissing the original proceeding. Judges Rowe, Kelsey, and M.K. Thomas concurred. The clerk’s slip notes that the judgment is not final until potential timely motions under Florida appellate rules are resolved.

The Supreme Court of Georgia accepted Shaquandra A. Woods’s petition for voluntary surrender of her law license after she admitted a felony conviction for conspiracy to commit wire fraud in federal court and acknowledged violating Rule 8.4(a)(2) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. The court treated the voluntary surrender as equivalent to disbarment, referencing recent precedents where felony convictions led to the same sanction. The Court ordered that Woods’s name be removed from the rolls of persons authorized to practice law in Georgia and reminded her of her duties under Bar Rule 4-219(b).

The Washington Court of Appeals affirmed a 14-day involuntary civil commitment of H.T., a 28-year-old nursing student, after finding she was gravely disabled under state law. The court held that recent, substantial evidence (testimony from H.T., her father, and a treating evaluator) showed severe deterioration in routine functioning—paranoia, insomnia, poor self-care, attempts to flee treatment, and inconsistent medication compliance—such that she could not make a rational decision about needed care and was not receiving essential care outside a hospital. The court rejected the argument that prior hospitalizations are required for commitment.

The Court of Appeal considered whether a juvenile who completed probation could have his adjudication dismissed and records sealed, and whether that dismissal removed a statutory firearms prohibition. The court held that an unqualified dismissal under Welfare & Institutions Code §782 after adjudication operates to set aside the findings as well as dismiss the petition, making the juvenile eligible to have all records sealed under §786. However, the court affirmed that the statutory firearms restriction (Penal Code §29820) survives sealing orders and continues to bar firearm possession until the statutory age. The judgment was modified to seal all counts and otherwise affirmed.

The Second Court of Appeals in Fort Worth considered John F. Ross’s petition for a writ of mandamus and an emergency stay arising from a Denton County trial-court matter (No. 17-3559-16). After review, the appellate court denied both the mandamus petition and the emergency stay in a per curiam memorandum opinion delivered May 1, 2026. The court provided no extended memorandum of reasons in this short opinion and therefore simply denied the requested extraordinary relief.

The Court of Appeals (13th District) denied Antonio G. Cantu's petitions for writ of mandamus challenging a trial court order that directed him to remove allegations describing criminal conduct from his pleadings and struck his pleadings when he failed to do so. The court reviewed mandamus standards and concluded Cantu did not meet his burden to show the trial court clearly abused its discretion or that he lacked an adequate appellate remedy. Because he failed to establish those requirements, the court refused extraordinary relief and denied all three mandamus petitions.

The Court of Appeals (Thirteenth District) denied Antonio G. Cantu’s petition and supplemental petition for a writ of mandamus challenging the trial court’s dismissal under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91a. The appellate court explained that mandamus is extraordinary relief requiring the relator to show a clear abuse of discretion and lack of an adequate appellate remedy, and that Cantu did not meet that burden. After considering the filings and the applicable law, the court concluded relief was not warranted and denied the petitions without granting any further relief.

The court denied Antonio G. Cantu’s petition and supplemental petition for a writ of mandamus asking the appellate court to order the trial court to disqualify the Texas Attorney General and an assistant attorney general from representing a party in the underlying suit. The court explained that mandamus is an extraordinary remedy and that the relator bears the burden to show a clear abuse of discretion by the trial court and lack of an adequate appellate remedy. After reviewing the filings and law, the court concluded Cantu did not meet that burden and therefore denied relief.

The Appellate Division (Fourth Department) reviewed reciprocal-discipline proceedings against attorney James Matthew Kernan after federal courts suspended him for misconduct. The court found Kernan filed cases in the Southern District of New York without admission there, made false statements about his admission status, and was suspended by the Southern and Eastern Districts and by the Second Circuit. Kernan's responses did not show lack of due process or inadequate proof. Considering mitigation and significant aggravating factors, including a prior felony-based suspension and other disciplinary findings, the court ordered Kernan disbarred.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department accepted attorney Howard Frank Gondree’s application to resign for non-disciplinary reasons and ordered his name removed from the roll of attorneys. The court treated the submission as a voluntary resignation not prompted by disciplinary charges and concluded that acceptance was appropriate. No further sanctions or proceedings were imposed; the court’s action is administrative, removing Gondree’s authority to practice in the state courts.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department, accepted Karen Clinton Dunn's application to resign from the Bar for non-disciplinary reasons and ordered her name removed from the roll of attorneys. The court treated the submission as a voluntary resignation not prompted by disciplinary charges and concluded acceptance was appropriate. The decision is a routine administrative action resolving Dunn's formal request to leave the bar without imposing discipline or further proceedings.

The Florida First District Court of Appeal dismissed Antwaun Brown’s original petition for a writ of prohibition against United Parcel Service, Inc. The brief per curiam order provides no opinion or reasoning and simply records the dismissal and that the decision is not final until the time for certain post-decision motions has passed. The petitioner proceeded pro se and respondent did not appear. The court's action ends this original proceeding in the appellate court for now.

The Texas Court of Appeals (Third District) denied Veronica R. Youngblood's petition for a writ of mandamus in an original proceeding from Bell County. The court issued a brief memorandum opinion and expressly denied relief under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. No further explanation of the merits or factual background is provided in the opinion.

The Texas Third Court of Appeals denied a petition for a writ of mandamus filed by Estephania Norma LeBaron in an original proceeding from Travis County. The court summarily concluded relief was not warranted and denied the petition under the appellate rules, without issuing further written reasons in this memorandum opinion. The decision leaves the trial court's actions undisturbed and declines to compel the requested extraordinary relief.

The Texas Third Court of Appeals denied in part a petition for a writ of mandamus filed by Brandy Gayle Self, dismissed an emergency relief request as moot, and dismissed other portions of the petition for lack of jurisdiction. The court also struck the mandamus record because it contained unredacted sensitive information. The opinion explains the court cannot grant relief against parties not properly before it and cites precedent and statute for jurisdictional limits and for protecting sensitive data in filings.

Relator, pro se, sought a writ of mandamus asking this Court to compel the presiding judge of the Austin County Court at Law to execute and clarify a qualified domestic relations order from relator’s 2024 divorce. The Third Court of Appeals dismissed the petition because it lacks mandamus jurisdiction over Austin County courts (Austin County is not in the Third Court of Appeals district) and relator did not show the writ was necessary to protect this court’s appellate jurisdiction. The petition was dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

The Texas Court of Appeals (Third District) denied a petition for a writ of mandamus filed by Austin Achieve Public Schools in an original proceeding from Travis County. The court issued a short memorandum opinion and explicitly denied the requested extraordinary relief under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. No detailed reasoning or factual background is provided in the published entry beyond the denial and the citation to the rule governing mandamus procedure.

The First District of Texas denied Ronald Lee Alexander’s petition for a writ of mandamus seeking an order that the trial court rule on unidentified pro se motions. Alexander alleged the trial court failed to perform a ministerial duty by not ruling, but he did not identify the motions or provide records showing they were filed and brought to the trial court’s attention. Because his petition did not meet the mandamus standards or the appellate rules requiring record support, the court concluded he failed to show entitlement to relief and denied the petition, dismissing any pending motions as moot.

The Court of Appeals dismissed LaCandreal Jackson’s petition for a writ of mandamus seeking an order directing a justice court to dissolve a receivership because the court lacks jurisdiction to issue mandamus against a justice court. The court explained its mandamus authority is limited by the Texas Government Code to certain judges (district, statutory county/probate, county court judges, some magistrates, and certain associate judges) and that relief against a justice court is not available from this court. The petition and any pending motions were dismissed as moot.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment disbarring attorney Diogu Kalu Diogu II in a lawyer-discipline proceeding filed by the Commission for Lawyer Discipline. The Commission alleged multiple violations of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct stemming from two underlying matters: misrepresentations and sanctionable litigation conduct in the Melanson case and submission of an unsigned contingent-fee agreement in the EIC matter. The appellate court affirmed after finding (1) the TCPA did not apply to disciplinary proceedings, (2) rule 18a did not prevent the respondent judge from trying the case while other recusal proceedings were pending, (3) timing rules did not divest jurisdiction, and (4) Diogu failed to provide the reporter’s record required to challenge the sufficiency of evidence or the sanction imposed.