Court Filings

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s denial of Redwood Toxicology Laboratory’s motion to compel arbitration of Robert Toothman’s individual employment claims and to dismiss class claims. Toothman had signed an arbitration agreement with Apex Life Sciences while Apex placed him at Redwood, but later was hired directly by Redwood and brought claims based on that direct employment. The appellate court held Redwood was not a party to the Apex arbitration agreement, the agreement did not cover disputes arising from Toothman’s later employment with Redwood, and equitable estoppel did not apply because the claims were not founded in or intertwined with the Apex agreement.

The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment and directed the trial court to vacate its denial of pretrial mental health diversion for Vincent Tourville, who pleaded no contest to felony corporal injury to a spouse after the trial court refused diversion but offered probation with the same treatment. The appellate court held that once a defendant is found eligible and suitable for diversion and does not pose an unreasonable risk of committing a statutory “super strike,” forcing a plea to obtain identical community treatment contradicts the statute’s purpose to treat mental disorders outside the criminal system. The court found the trial court abused its discretion by denying diversion based on public- and victim-safety concerns despite having found Tourville did not pose an unreasonable risk under the statute.

The Court of Appeal affirmed Mark Mijares’s conviction for first degree murder for the fatal 2019 attack on Juan Cordova. Mijares argued the trial court should have instructed the jury on attempted murder because Cordova’s preexisting heart and liver disease, and the month-long hospitalization before death, could have broken the causal link. The court held the evidence showed Mijares’s assault was a substantial factor and the proximate cause of death, so attempted murder instruction was not required. The court rejected other challenges, but ordered correction of Mijares’s presentence custody credits to 1,669 days.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the superior court’s denial of Alvin Pineda’s petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6. Pineda sought resentencing after Senate Bill 1437 changed murder liability rules, but the court concluded that declarations made by codefendant Gilberto Salinas during a recorded jailhouse conversation — admitted at Pineda’s preliminary hearing through Officer Carias’s testimony — were admissible as statements against penal interest. Those statements identified Pineda as the shooter, and the court found they provided substantial evidence that Pineda could still be convicted under current law, so resentencing relief was properly denied.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s resentencing of Lorenzo Moss under Penal Code section 1172.75. Moss had been originally sentenced to an upper term for willful traumatic injury to a romantic partner; at resentencing the court struck invalid enhancements but reimposed an upper term. Moss argued the court needed jury findings or his stipulation for aggravating facts under the amended sentencing rules. The appellate panel held the resentencing statute’s specific language allows reimposition of an original upper term without new jury findings, so the trial court did not exceed its authority.

The Court of Appeal considered whether a juvenile who completed probation could have his adjudication dismissed and records sealed, and whether that dismissal removed a statutory firearms prohibition. The court held that an unqualified dismissal under Welfare & Institutions Code §782 after adjudication operates to set aside the findings as well as dismiss the petition, making the juvenile eligible to have all records sealed under §786. However, the court affirmed that the statutory firearms restriction (Penal Code §29820) survives sealing orders and continues to bar firearm possession until the statutory age. The judgment was modified to seal all counts and otherwise affirmed.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction and sentence of Brad Zack Berch for felony false imprisonment by violence or menace and a true finding on a great-bodily-injury enhancement involving domestic violence. The jury heard evidence that Berch drove erratically, bypassed exits to the victim’s home, stopped near her house, refused to let her out, verbally taunted her, then accelerated and turned sharply, ejecting and injuring her. The court held there was substantial evidence supporting both menace and violence theories, rejected claims of instructional error and ineffective assistance for failing to request a mistake-of-fact instruction, and found no error in the enhancement instruction.

The California Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal and held that Penal Code section 189(e)(2) requires proof that a nonkiller who acted with an intent to kill aided or assisted the actual killer in the lethal act itself, not merely in the underlying felony. Morris sought resentencing under section 1172.6 after Senate Bill 1437 narrowed felony-murder liability; the record showed he had intent to kill but did not establish whether he fired the fatal shot. Because the statute’s phrase requires aiding the actual killer in the commission of murder, the matter is remanded for reconsideration under that standard.

The Court of Appeal reviewed postdissolution litigation between former spouses Mizuki Nishida (appellant) and Masashi Kamoda (respondent). Nishida sued in civil court alleging Kamoda fraudulently induced her to accept a postjudgment stipulation dividing a retirement asset. The civil court transferred the case to family law court, which dismissed it as untimely under Family Code section 2122 and denied leave to amend. The appellate court reversed those rulings and remanded, concluding Nishida timely filed within the one-year discovery period, transfer cured any jurisdictional defect, and leave to amend should have been granted. The court affirmed the civil court’s grant of relief from default to Kamoda.

The Court of Appeal reversed a trial court grant of summary judgment for the California Franchise Tax Board in a tax-refund suit by Texas radiologist Xavier Garcia-Rojas. The trial court had concluded Garcia-Rojas operated a unitary sole proprietorship and thus was taxable under a California regulation allocating income of unitary businesses. The appellate court held the Board failed to prove as a matter of law that a sole proprietor engaged in a single business activity is a unitary business; the Board cited no controlling authority applying the unitary theory to a single-person sole proprietorship. The case is remanded for further proceedings.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s order dismissing and striking the plaintiff’s class claims and denied relief as to the order compelling individual arbitration. Plaintiff Arturo Vela, a railcar repairman employed by Harbor Rail Services, argued the Federal Arbitration Act’s (FAA) §1 exemption for "railroad employees" or transportation workers applied, which would make his arbitration agreement subject to state law and potentially invalidate the class-waiver. The court held Vela was neither a "railroad employee" nor a transportation worker under Supreme Court precedent (Circuit City/Saxon), so the FAA governs. Because federal law applies, the class-waiver is enforceable and arbitration was properly compelled.

The Court of Appeal reversed two convictions and affirmed one from defendant Wayne Hansen Hsiung’s convictions arising from “open rescue” animal-rights protests at Sonoma County poultry farms. The court held the trial court erred by barring a mistake-of-law defense based on defendant’s good-faith (though mistaken) reliance on legal advice that a necessity justification made trespass lawful for rescuing or treating suffering animals; that defect required reversal of the conspiracy count and one trespass count and remand for further proceedings. The court rejected challenges to Penal Code section 31 and to section 602(o) and affirmed the remaining conviction.

The Court of Appeal reversed in part and affirmed in part. After a 2018 marital dissolution divided a retirement asset, the parties signed a stipulation dividing the remaining proceeds. In 2020 the wife (Nishida) sued the husband (Kamoda) in civil court for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty, alleging he misrepresented his employment status to induce the stipulation. The civil court transferred the case to family court, which dismissed as time-barred and denied leave to amend; the Court of Appeal held the dismissal and denial of leave were erroneous because the complaint was timely under Family Code section 2122(a) and transfer resolved any jurisdictional problem. The court affirmed the civil court’s grant of relief from default to Kamoda under Code of Civil Procedure section 473(b).

The California Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and death sentence of Cary Anthony Stayner for the murders of Carole Sund, her daughters’ friend Silvina Pelosso, and 15-year-old Juli Sund, and related kidnapping. After a jury convicted Stayner of three counts of murder and one count of kidnapping, found multiple special circumstance allegations true, found him sane, and the jury fixed penalty at death, the trial court denied motions for new trial and sentence modification. The high court reviewed guilt, sanity, and penalty-phase claims and concluded the record did not establish reversible error, affirming the judgment in full.

The California Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal and remanded the case of Robert Lopez, convicted in 2007 of murder and related offenses, for further proceedings under Penal Code section 1172.6 (Senate Bill 1437/775). The trial court had denied his resentencing petition after an evidentiary hearing; the Court of Appeal affirmed on the ground Lopez forfeited his instructional-ambiguity claim by not raising it on direct appeal. The Supreme Court held that section 1172.6 does not categorically bar petitions based on jury instruction ambiguity that may have permitted conviction by imputed malice, and ordered the appellate court to consider Lopez’s claims on the merits.

The California Supreme Court held that trial courts may order pretrial detention of noncapital defendants only in the specific circumstances described by article I, section 12 (subdivisions (b) and (c)) of the California Constitution. Where detention is not authorized under section 12, a court may condition release on monetary bail only after an individualized assessment and must set bail in an amount that is reasonable and generally attainable given the defendant’s circumstances. The decision reconciles section 12 with article I, section 28(f)(3), reaffirming that public and victim safety remain primary considerations but do not expand the categories of offenses subject to detention.

The Court of Appeal reversed a superior court judgment that had dismissed a Proposition 65 enforcement lawsuit for inadequate pre-suit notice. The plaintiff, a private enforcer, had sent a 60-day notice that identified the organization and provided contact information for its outside counsel rather than a specific internal “responsible individual.” The appellate court followed a recent decision (Pancho Villa’s) and held the regulation requiring a contact for the noticing entity is directory, not mandatory, and that the notice here substantially complied with the regulation’s purposes (informing prosecutors and giving defendants an opportunity to investigate and cure). The case is remanded for further proceedings.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s denial of Christopher Garner’s writ petition after the California Victim Compensation Board rejected his request for compensation under Penal Code section 4900. Garner had his 2007 murder conviction vacated and resentenced under Penal Code section 1172.6, and he sought compensation for time served beyond the revised sentence. The Board denied the claim because Garner did not allege an "erroneous conviction" as required by section 4900 — his original conviction was lawful under the law in effect at the time — and the Board permissibly used a regulation (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 642) to screen and dismiss legally deficient claims without a hearing. The court held the statute and regulation were correctly applied and valid.

The Court of Appeal affirmed a trial court award of attorney fees to environmental group Raptors Are the Solution under California’s private attorney general statute (Code Civ. Proc. § 1021.5). Raptors sued the Department of Pesticide Regulation over its renewals and reevaluation decisions for certain rodenticides. Two trade associations (CropLife and RISE) intervened to defend the Department and were held jointly and severally liable for fees along with other defending parties. The appellate court found the associations had asserted direct pecuniary interests when seeking intervention, actively participated in the litigation, and therefore qualified as opposing parties eligible to share fee liability. The court also upheld the trial court’s fee calculation and refusal to apportion liability among defenders.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to increase defendant Sami Wayne Mohammed’s sentence after execution of his original sentence had begun. Mohammed initially received an aggregate seven-year, four-month term on January 12, 2024. The CDCR later notified the trial court that parts of that sentence were unauthorized under the Three Strikes law, and the trial court resentenced Mohammed on October 21, 2024 to an aggregate 10 years, eight months. The appellate court concluded the trial court could not lawfully resentence him after jurisdiction had ended, treated the appeal as a habeas petition, granted relief, and ordered reinstatement of the January 12, 2024 sentence.

The Court of Appeal affirmed a trial-court order exonerating a $180,000 bail bond conditioned on payment of extradition costs and later awarding $7,492.40 in extradition expenses to the district attorney. North River (the surety) argued the bond could not be exonerated because the defendant was not physically present when the court acted and that the court lost jurisdiction to order extradition costs. The court held the defendant’s appearance by counsel under Penal Code section 977 satisfied the requirement in section 1305(c)(1) to exonerate the bond, and the court properly ordered extradition costs under section 1306(b).

The Court of Appeal reversed a trial-court grant of summary judgment in a malicious-prosecution suit brought by attorney Brian Detrick against his former client, Keiko Shimada. Shimada had voluntarily dismissed a prior malpractice case and moved for summary judgment, claiming the dismissal was motivated by the statute of limitations (a procedural ground that would bar malicious prosecution). The trial court relied on Shimada’s English-language declaration, but the appellate court held that because Shimada cannot read or speak English the declaration was incompetent absent evidence identifying and qualifying the interpreter/translator and an attestation that the translation accurately reflected Shimada’s words. The judgment for Shimada was reversed and the summary-judgment motion must be denied.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment for Southern California Permanente Medical Group (SCPMG) in a negligence suit after a bicyclist was struck by SCPMG employee Dr. Brittany Doremus while she was driving to work. The court held SCPMG met its initial burden by submitting uncontradicted deposition evidence that Doremus was on an ordinary morning commute and not performing work when the collision occurred, shifting the burden to the plaintiff, who failed to produce admissible evidence creating a triable issue. The court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that occasional work-from-home status converted home into a second worksite on the day of the accident.

The California Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to Hensel Phelps and remanded for further proceedings. AVL, a supplier/installer of vehicle emissions testing equipment, sought a declaratory judgment that its claims for payment were not barred by the Contractors State Licensing Law because its equipment did not “become a fixed part of the structure” under Business and Professions Code section 7045. The appellate court held the factual question whether the goods became part of the structure is for a trier of fact; competing expert declarations and voluminous record evidence created a triable issue, so summary judgment was improper.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s denial of the district’s anti‑SLAPP motion. The Yolo‑Solano Air Quality Management District sued Diamond D General Engineering and Spencer Defty for alleged permitting and air‑quality violations. Diamond and Defty cross‑complained seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging the district relied on a secret internal policy (Policy 24) not adopted through required rulemaking. The appellate court held the cross‑complaint challenged the validity of Policy 24 rather than merely the district’s investigative or enforcement acts, so the claims did not arise from protected petitioning or speech and the anti‑SLAPP motion failed.

The California Supreme Court reversed the juvenile court’s orders terminating a mother’s parental rights to her two young children and remanded for further proceedings. The juvenile court had ended reunification services and set permanency hearings after finding the children likely to be adopted, but the high court held a likelihood-of-adoption finding alone is not enough to terminate parental rights — the court must also make one of the statutory additional findings or find no applicable exception. The Court also held the mother received ineffective assistance of counsel because her attorney failed to assert her statutory right to reunification services for one child and failed to pursue writ review, requiring vacation of those orders and a new hearing.

The Court of Appeal granted Karla Amezcua’s petition for a writ of mandate and ordered the trial court to remove a condition requiring her to pay Massage Envy’s attorney fees as a term of leave to amend her complaint. The trial court had sustained Massage Envy’s demurrer but conditioned granting Amezcua leave to amend on payment of $25,000 in fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 473. The appellate court held section 473 does not authorize shifting attorney fees and that fee-shifting must be grounded in statute or agreement; the trial court therefore erred by imposing a fee condition under section 473.

The Court of Appeal (First Appellate District, Div. Three) reviewed a challenge to probation condition no. 24, which allowed the probation department to jail a probationer for up to 120 days if he did not "successfully complete" residential treatment and denied credits for time in unsuccessful programs. Although Emrick’s probation was later terminated and he received the disputed custody credits, the court exercised discretion to decide the issues because they are recurring. The court held the condition impermissibly delegated core judicial authority to probation and was invalid for failing to reflect a knowing waiver of the statutory right to custody credits under Penal Code section 2900.5.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the superior court’s denial of Blue Origin’s motion to compel arbitration of former employee Craig Stoker’s employment claims. The court found the arbitration agreement procedurally unconscionable because it was an adhesion contract presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, and substantively unconscionable because it was overbroad, lacked mutuality, waived jury trial, and barred representative claims including PAGA-style claims. Because multiple defects tainted the agreement and severance would not cure the one-sided scheme, the court held the arbitration clause unenforceable and affirmed denial of the petition to compel arbitration.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s denial of Citizens Against Marketplace Apartment/Condo Development’s petitions challenging the City of San Ramon’s approval of an infill housing project at Marketplace Center and the city’s finding that the project was categorically exempt from environmental review under CEQA. Citizens argued the project conflicted with the general plan and zoning because a joint “master plan” was allegedly required and the development was not a proper horizontal mixed-use. The court found substantial evidence supported the city’s consistency findings and that CEQA’s in-fill exemption applied, and it upheld the trial court’s award of record-preparation costs to the city.