Court Filings

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment adjudicating Patrick Darrell Gibson guilty of possession of a controlled substance and revoking his deferred-adjudication community supervision after Gibson pleaded true to the revocation allegations. Gibson was originally placed on deferred adjudication following a guilty plea; the State later moved to revoke supervision, he admitted the allegations, and the trial court adjudicated guilt and sentenced him to 240 days in jail. Appellate counsel filed an Anders brief concluding the appeal is frivolous; the appeals court independently reviewed the record and found no arguable issues, granted counsel’s motion to withdraw, and affirmed.

The court reviewed Chandler Keith Rodgers’s appeal from his conviction for possession with intent to deliver more than 400 grams of methamphetamine. Rodgers pleaded guilty and asked for a jury to assess punishment; the jury sentenced him to 70 years’ imprisonment. Appellate counsel filed a motion to withdraw supported by an Anders brief asserting the appeal is frivolous; Rodgers filed a pro se brief. After an independent review of the record and briefs, the court found no arguable grounds for appeal, granted counsel’s motion to withdraw, and affirmed the trial court’s judgment.

The Texas Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s entry of an agreed protective order between April Vanderbilt and Keith Travis incorporated into a mediated settlement agreement (MSA) resolving their divorce and protective-order application. Travis sought to modify the order’s lifetime duration to two years, arguing the court made no family-violence findings required for a lifetime order under Article 7B, but the appellate court held that the MSA met statutory requirements that entitle parties to judgment. Because the MSA complied with Tex. Fam. Code § 6.602, the trial court was required to enter the agreed order and did not err.

The Second Court of Appeals in Fort Worth considered John F. Ross’s petition for a writ of mandamus and an emergency stay arising from a Denton County trial-court matter (No. 17-3559-16). After review, the appellate court denied both the mandamus petition and the emergency stay in a per curiam memorandum opinion delivered May 1, 2026. The court provided no extended memorandum of reasons in this short opinion and therefore simply denied the requested extraordinary relief.

The Court of Appeals (13th District) denied Antonio G. Cantu's petitions for writ of mandamus challenging a trial court order that directed him to remove allegations describing criminal conduct from his pleadings and struck his pleadings when he failed to do so. The court reviewed mandamus standards and concluded Cantu did not meet his burden to show the trial court clearly abused its discretion or that he lacked an adequate appellate remedy. Because he failed to establish those requirements, the court refused extraordinary relief and denied all three mandamus petitions.

The Court of Appeals (Thirteenth District) denied Antonio G. Cantu’s petition and supplemental petition for a writ of mandamus challenging the trial court’s dismissal under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91a. The appellate court explained that mandamus is extraordinary relief requiring the relator to show a clear abuse of discretion and lack of an adequate appellate remedy, and that Cantu did not meet that burden. After considering the filings and the applicable law, the court concluded relief was not warranted and denied the petitions without granting any further relief.

The court denied Antonio G. Cantu’s petition and supplemental petition for a writ of mandamus asking the appellate court to order the trial court to disqualify the Texas Attorney General and an assistant attorney general from representing a party in the underlying suit. The court explained that mandamus is an extraordinary remedy and that the relator bears the burden to show a clear abuse of discretion by the trial court and lack of an adequate appellate remedy. After reviewing the filings and law, the court concluded Cantu did not meet that burden and therefore denied relief.

The Texas Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s temporary injunction that had blocked the Texas Department of State Health Services from treating manufactured delta-8 THC products as Schedule I controlled substances. The Department and its commissioner had amended Schedule I definitions after objecting to a federal rule; the Court held those amendments were within the commissioner’s broad, statutorily granted discretion and did not conflict unambiguously with the 2019 Texas Farm Bill. The Court also held the Administrative Procedure Act did not govern publication of schedule changes, and that sovereign immunity bars the vendors’ claims.

Justice Sullivan dissents from the Court’s interpretation of Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 18.001. He would hold that when a defendant serves a controverting affidavit the statute’s hearsay exception for medical-expense affidavits is defeated as to the entire affidavit, not just the particular line items the counteraffidavit disputes. Because the defendant served a controverting affidavit here, Ortiz could not rely on her medical-affidavits alone and the trial court properly denied a new trial on damages. Sullivan argues the statute’s plain text refers to "affidavits," so its all-or-nothing approach must be applied even if it creates odd or inefficient results.

The Texas Supreme Court held that when a party uses the pretrial affidavit process in Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 18.001 to prove medical expenses, only those specific items or charges that are actually controverted by a compliant counteraffidavit lose the statute’s evidentiary effect. Unchallenged portions of an initial affidavit remain competent evidence and may be submitted to the factfinder. The court reversed the court of appeals and remanded because the trial court erred by excluding entire medical-cost affidavits and counteraffidavits even though only portions were controverted, which deprived the claimant of admissible evidence of certain medical expenses.

The Fourth Court of Appeals reviewed a remand judgment in a medical-malpractice case after the Texas Supreme Court directed corrections: apply a settlement credit and structure periodic payments for future medical expenses. The appeals court concluded the trial court misallocated the lump-sum portion of the judgment by overstating attorney’s fees and certain interim medical costs but otherwise complied with the Supreme Court’s instructions and statutory law. The court suggested a remittitur of $533,038.51 to cure the error and affirmed the judgment as modified if the remittitur is timely filed; otherwise it will reverse and remand.

The court affirmed the trial court’s order allowing the guardian, Linda Cristina Benavides Alexander, to establish an estate/transfer plan for her incapacitated father, Carlos Y. Benavides Jr. The wife, Leticia R. Benavides, appealed arguing lack of standing, insufficient evidence, guardian incapacity, res judicata, and procedural errors. The appellate court found the 1986 will was admitted and could be considered, concluded the trial court reasonably relied on that will under Texas Estates Code chapter 1162, found no reversible abuse of discretion, rejected Leticia’s capacity and res judicata defenses, and determined any failures to file findings, rule on special exceptions, or admit exhibits were harmless.

The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed a jury verdict finding appellant Deborah Morales liable under Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code §12.002 for filing a fraudulent affidavit claiming adverse possession of a private road. The jury awarded statutory damages of $10,000 to each appellee, attorney’s fees to the Walkers, and costs; the appellate court modified the trial judgment to correct the post-judgment interest rate to 7.75% and otherwise affirmed. The court rejected Morales’s sufficiency, evidentiary, and jury-charge complaints as unsupported or waived, found the evidence legally sufficient to prove fraudulent filing and intent to harm, and affirmed fee and damage awards subject to preservation rules.

The Court of Appeals denied the defendant's fifth motion for extension to file an appellate brief, abated the appeal, and remanded the case to the trial court for a hearing under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.8(b). The trial court must determine whether the appellant wants to continue the appeal and whether his counsel has abandoned the appeal, make written findings and recommendations, appoint substitute counsel if necessary, transcribe the hearing, and forward supplemental clerk’s and reporter’s records to the Court of Appeals by June 1, 2026. The court denied further extension and ordered the procedures to protect the appellant's right to counsel on appeal.

The Court of Appeals affirmed Ray Canek Vera’s convictions for murder and two aggravated assaults arising from a bar fight that escalated outside the bar. The court held the trial judge did not abuse discretion in excluding the defense’s forensic psychologist expert testimony about fight-or-flight and alcohol effects, because the defense did not separate inadmissible intoxication evidence from potentially admissible neuroscience testimony and Texas precedent bars using voluntary intoxication to negate mens rea. The court also held the trial court properly refused a sudden-passion instruction because the record did not minimally show adequate provocation that would cause ordinary persons to lose cool reflection.

The Court of Appeals abated this appeal of a final divorce decree and sent the case back to the trial court so it can reconsider a wife’s motion to modify temporary orders entered during the appeal. The trial court previously entered temporary orders in July 2025, reserved other relief pending mediation, and later held a hearing on the wife’s motion to modify seeking child support, attorneys’ fees, security for any stayed property division, and other relief. The appeals court concluded the trial court retains jurisdiction to modify temporary orders under Family Code §109.001(b-3)–(b-4) and ordered the parties to report back by June 1, 2026.

The Texas Third Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court order requiring father Nomeli Nunez to pay monthly support and health-insurance contributions for his adult daughter, O.F.N., who the trial court found requires substantial care and personal supervision because of disabilities beginning before age 18. The appeals court found sufficient evidence of disabling physical and mental conditions, the mother’s caregiving role, and the parents’ relative financial resources to support the award and arrearage calculation. The court reversed the award of the mother’s $25,468.46 attorney’s fees because the billing records were too heavily redacted to support the fee award and remanded that issue for further proceedings.

The Court of Appeals affirmed Michael Alamia’s conviction for sexual assault of a child, rejecting his claim that the trial court erred by giving a supplemental jury instruction (an Allen charge) after the jury reported difficulty reaching a verdict. The court concluded the instruction, read after a juror note about possible bias, was a traditional Allen charge phrased in a non-coercive way and accompanied by a reminder against allowing verdicts to be determined by prejudice. Reviewing for abuse of discretion, the court found the language appropriate in context and consistent with Texas precedent, so the conviction and 75-year sentence were affirmed.

The Court of Appeals reviewed two Williamson County district court orders: (1) denying Luke Dillon’s petition to modify the parent-child relationship, and (2) granting in part and denying in part his motion to enforce their 2019 agreed divorce decree. The court held that Dillon failed to prove a material and substantial change in circumstances to justify the conservatorship changes he sought, but the trial court abused its discretion by granting two conservatorship modifications (exclusive psychiatric-consent to Bamford and mandatory therapist-determined therapy frequency). On enforcement, the court found Bamford improperly claimed the children in 2019 and awarded Dillon $8,774, but affirmed denial of relief for alleged 2021 tax harms.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of attorney Jason Murray Davis’s motion to dismiss under the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA). The Graham Parties sued Davis for breach of fiduciary duty and fraud by nondisclosure after Davis represented Graham’s wife in divorce proceedings while having previously represented Graham and related family entities. The court concluded the claims were based on Davis’s alleged conduct and failures to disclose an adverse representation and misuse of confidential information—not on Davis’s communications in a judicial proceeding or on protected speech—so the TCPA did not apply.

The Texas Court of Appeals (Third District) denied Veronica R. Youngblood's petition for a writ of mandamus in an original proceeding from Bell County. The court issued a brief memorandum opinion and expressly denied relief under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. No further explanation of the merits or factual background is provided in the opinion.

The Texas Court of Appeals (Third District) denied a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed by Kailyn Andrews and dismissed as moot an associated motion for emergency temporary relief. The decision is a short memorandum opinion resolving the original habeas proceeding that originated in Bell County. The court provided its disposition without extended explanation, relying on appellate procedural rules for habeas filings and emergency requests.

The Texas Third Court of Appeals denied a petition for a writ of mandamus filed by Estephania Norma LeBaron in an original proceeding from Travis County. The court summarily concluded relief was not warranted and denied the petition under the appellate rules, without issuing further written reasons in this memorandum opinion. The decision leaves the trial court's actions undisturbed and declines to compel the requested extraordinary relief.

The Texas Third Court of Appeals denied in part a petition for a writ of mandamus filed by Brandy Gayle Self, dismissed an emergency relief request as moot, and dismissed other portions of the petition for lack of jurisdiction. The court also struck the mandamus record because it contained unredacted sensitive information. The opinion explains the court cannot grant relief against parties not properly before it and cites precedent and statute for jurisdictional limits and for protecting sensitive data in filings.

Relator, pro se, sought a writ of mandamus asking this Court to compel the presiding judge of the Austin County Court at Law to execute and clarify a qualified domestic relations order from relator’s 2024 divorce. The Third Court of Appeals dismissed the petition because it lacks mandamus jurisdiction over Austin County courts (Austin County is not in the Third Court of Appeals district) and relator did not show the writ was necessary to protect this court’s appellate jurisdiction. The petition was dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

The Texas Court of Appeals (Third District) denied a petition for a writ of mandamus filed by Austin Achieve Public Schools in an original proceeding from Travis County. The court issued a short memorandum opinion and explicitly denied the requested extraordinary relief under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. No detailed reasoning or factual background is provided in the published entry beyond the denial and the citation to the rule governing mandamus procedure.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant Artavias Edwards’s conviction for driving while intoxicated with a blood-alcohol level of .15 or more. Edwards argued the trial court erred by denying motions to suppress the blood-warrant evidence and field-sobriety test recordings and by denying a motion for mistrial based on alleged discovery violations. The court concluded the warrant affidavit provided a substantial basis for probable cause, the sobriety tests and recordings were non-testimonial physical evidence so no Fifth or Sixth Amendment right barred their use, and the mistrial complaint was not preserved because the motion was untimely and no continuance was sought.

The court granted the appellant's unopposed motion to dismiss the appeal because the parties resolved their differences. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal under the applicable Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure and found any other pending motions moot. The decision is brief and procedural, without reaching the underlying merits of the dispute.

The appellant, The Methodist Hospital Research Institute (doing business as Houston Methodist Research Institute), filed a motion to voluntarily dismiss its appeal from a Harris County district court judgment. The First Court of Appeals granted the motion under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.1(a)(1), dismissed the appeal, and denied as moot any other pending motions. No other party appealed and the court had not issued an opinion before dismissal.

The First District of Texas dismissed this civil appeal because the appellants failed to pay or arrange payment for the clerk’s record and did not respond to the court’s notice that the appeal was subject to dismissal. The court concluded appellants’ inaction constituted lack of prosecution and dismissed the appeal, also denying as moot any outstanding motions. The decision was issued as a short per curiam memorandum opinion.