Court Filings

The Georgia Court of Appeals considered an application for an interlocutory appeal filed in case A26I0187 (LC No. 25C11603), captioned Matthew Baratian v. Theresa Strickland. The court reviewed the application and denied it on May 6, 2026. No further explanation or reasoning is included in the order; it is a short ministerial entry certifying the denial and the clerk's certification of the minutes.

The Florida First District Court of Appeal considered a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus by Tyi DeJesus Nettles. The court denied the petition to the extent it alleged ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, and dismissed the petition in all other respects. The court cited Baker v. State (2004) in its disposition and noted the opinion is nonfinal pending any timely motions under the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. No further explanation of facts or merits appears in the short opinion.

The Ohio Court of Appeals dismissed Michael-Rashaad Williamson’s original action seeking a writ of prohibition against the City of Toledo, its police department, the Toledo Municipal Court prosecutor, and an IRS commissioner. The court explained that a writ of prohibition may only be issued against persons exercising judicial or quasi-judicial power, and prosecutors and police do not qualify. Because the named respondents do not exercise the required judicial authority and the complaint sought dismissal and expungement of a pending criminal case, the relator cannot prevail and the writ was denied as a matter of law.

The Florida First District Court of Appeal denied David Nathaniel Reese’s petition for a writ of mandamus seeking relief against the Attorney General and the Department of Children and Families. The court considered an original petition filed by Reese and, without published opinion or extended explanation, entered a per curiam order denying the request. The denial leaves in place the lower-court or administrative course of action that Reese sought to change and provides no relief from the challenged decision or duty he asked the court to compel.

The Georgia Court of Appeals considered an application for discretionary appeal filed in case A26D0457, Karon Courtney v. Moody Law P.C. et al., arising from litigation under LC No. 24CV002138. The court reviewed the application and denied the request for discretionary review on May 5, 2026. No further reasoning, findings, or modification of the underlying judgment are provided in the order; the document only records the procedural disposition denying the application for discretionary appeal.

The Supreme Court of Georgia denied a petition for certiorari in Amy Wade Johnson v. City of Vidalia, leaving in place the Court of Appeals' reversal of the trial court’s denial of summary judgment for the City. Justice Pinson concurred, agreeing denial was proper because the Court of Appeals also held Johnson failed to show disputed facts about the City’s notice of the sidewalk defect — an independently sufficient ground. Justice Pinson cautioned that the Court of Appeals erred in suggesting municipalities cannot be liable for passive failures to maintain sidewalks and noted that existing Georgia precedent establishes municipal duty to keep sidewalks safe when the city had actual or constructive notice of defects.

The Georgia Court of Appeals considered an application for an interlocutory appeal filed in case A26I0189 (LC No. 24SV094) and denied the application on May 4, 2026. The order is brief and procedural: the court declined to allow an immediate appeal from an interlocutory order, leaving the underlying trial-court proceedings to continue in the trial court. No substantive discussion of the merits or legal reasoning is included in the order.

The Georgia Court of Appeals denied an emergency motion by The Georgia Virtue seeking expedited consideration and an immediate reversal of a trial court order before May 7, 2026. The court’s order is procedural and short: it simply refuses the request for accelerated review and does not address the merits of the underlying appeal or the trial court’s judgment. No opinion or reasoning on the substantive issues was issued, and the usual appellate schedule and procedures remain in place.

The Georgia Court of Appeals considered an application for discretionary appeal filed by Antonio Alacena in case A26D0448 (LC# 25CV017130) and denied the application on May 4, 2026. The order is a short administrative disposition: the court refused to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction and therefore did not grant review of the underlying trial-court matter. No substantive legal reasoning or discussion of the merits appears in the document; it is a formal minutes entry certifying the denial.

The Ohio Supreme Court denied most of Melanie Leneghan’s mandamus claims after the Delaware County Board of Elections sustained a challenge to her voter registration and candidacy. The board found she lacked a fixed habitation in Delaware County between January and November 2025 and concluded she had not established bona fide residence in Galena thereafter. The court dismissed Leneghan’s request to force the board to retract referrals to prosecutors as improper injunctive relief, and denied the remaining mandamus relief because the board did not abuse its discretion or clearly disregard R.C. 3503.02 when canceling her registration and removing her from the ballot.

The Second Court of Appeals in Fort Worth considered John F. Ross’s petition for a writ of mandamus and an emergency stay arising from a Denton County trial-court matter (No. 17-3559-16). After review, the appellate court denied both the mandamus petition and the emergency stay in a per curiam memorandum opinion delivered May 1, 2026. The court provided no extended memorandum of reasons in this short opinion and therefore simply denied the requested extraordinary relief.

The Court of Appeals (13th District) denied Antonio G. Cantu's petitions for writ of mandamus challenging a trial court order that directed him to remove allegations describing criminal conduct from his pleadings and struck his pleadings when he failed to do so. The court reviewed mandamus standards and concluded Cantu did not meet his burden to show the trial court clearly abused its discretion or that he lacked an adequate appellate remedy. Because he failed to establish those requirements, the court refused extraordinary relief and denied all three mandamus petitions.

The Court of Appeals (Thirteenth District) denied Antonio G. Cantu’s petition and supplemental petition for a writ of mandamus challenging the trial court’s dismissal under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91a. The appellate court explained that mandamus is extraordinary relief requiring the relator to show a clear abuse of discretion and lack of an adequate appellate remedy, and that Cantu did not meet that burden. After considering the filings and the applicable law, the court concluded relief was not warranted and denied the petitions without granting any further relief.

The court denied Antonio G. Cantu’s petition and supplemental petition for a writ of mandamus asking the appellate court to order the trial court to disqualify the Texas Attorney General and an assistant attorney general from representing a party in the underlying suit. The court explained that mandamus is an extraordinary remedy and that the relator bears the burden to show a clear abuse of discretion by the trial court and lack of an adequate appellate remedy. After reviewing the filings and law, the court concluded Cantu did not meet that burden and therefore denied relief.

The Georgia Court of Appeals denied Sherry Everett’s emergency motion seeking a supersedeas (bond-based stay) and a stay pending appeal. The court considered the request and issued an order on May 1, 2026, declining to halt the lower-court judgment or proceedings while Everett’s appeal is pending. No additional reasoning or conditions were provided in the brief order, which simply records the denial and the clerk’s certification.

The Texas Court of Appeals (Third District) denied Veronica R. Youngblood's petition for a writ of mandamus in an original proceeding from Bell County. The court issued a brief memorandum opinion and expressly denied relief under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. No further explanation of the merits or factual background is provided in the opinion.

The Texas Court of Appeals (Third District) denied a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed by Kailyn Andrews and dismissed as moot an associated motion for emergency temporary relief. The decision is a short memorandum opinion resolving the original habeas proceeding that originated in Bell County. The court provided its disposition without extended explanation, relying on appellate procedural rules for habeas filings and emergency requests.

The Texas Third Court of Appeals denied a petition for a writ of mandamus filed by Estephania Norma LeBaron in an original proceeding from Travis County. The court summarily concluded relief was not warranted and denied the petition under the appellate rules, without issuing further written reasons in this memorandum opinion. The decision leaves the trial court's actions undisturbed and declines to compel the requested extraordinary relief.

The Texas Third Court of Appeals denied in part a petition for a writ of mandamus filed by Brandy Gayle Self, dismissed an emergency relief request as moot, and dismissed other portions of the petition for lack of jurisdiction. The court also struck the mandamus record because it contained unredacted sensitive information. The opinion explains the court cannot grant relief against parties not properly before it and cites precedent and statute for jurisdictional limits and for protecting sensitive data in filings.

The Texas Court of Appeals (Third District) denied a petition for a writ of mandamus filed by Austin Achieve Public Schools in an original proceeding from Travis County. The court issued a short memorandum opinion and explicitly denied the requested extraordinary relief under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. No detailed reasoning or factual background is provided in the published entry beyond the denial and the citation to the rule governing mandamus procedure.

The First District of Texas denied Ronald Lee Alexander’s petition for a writ of mandamus seeking an order that the trial court rule on unidentified pro se motions. Alexander alleged the trial court failed to perform a ministerial duty by not ruling, but he did not identify the motions or provide records showing they were filed and brought to the trial court’s attention. Because his petition did not meet the mandamus standards or the appellate rules requiring record support, the court concluded he failed to show entitlement to relief and denied the petition, dismissing any pending motions as moot.

The Fifteenth Court of Appeals denied mandamus relief to Novartis in a qui tam suit brought under the Texas Health Care Program Fraud Prevention Act, and Chief Justice Scott A. Brister filed a dissent. The dissent argues the Court should have addressed two constitutional questions: whether a for-profit litigation fund (Relator HSG) has constitutional standing to seek punitive civil penalties on the State’s behalf, and whether permitting any private person to bring such suits unlawfully delegates executive power in violation of the Texas Constitution. The dissent concludes HSG lacks constitutional standing and that allowing private enforcement of penal remedies without involvement of elected state officers violates separation of powers.

The Fifteenth Court of Appeals denied Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation’s petition for a writ of mandamus seeking to compel dismissal of a qui tam suit filed by Health Selection Group (HSG). Novartis argued HSG lacked standing under the Texas Medicaid Fraud Prevention Act and that the Act’s qui tam provisions violate separation of powers. The court concluded mandamus was premature because Novartis has an adequate appellate remedy; the ordinary appeal process (after summary judgment or trial) can address the disputes and cost or delay alone do not make appeal inadequate. The petition was therefore denied.

The Tenth District Court of Appeals denied Lorenza Barnette’s petition for a writ of mandamus and granted the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction’s motion for summary judgment. Barnette sought an order directing the Department to change its records to reflect that his June 28, 2021 entry imposed no prison sentence. The court concluded the 2011 judgment imposing two life-without-parole terms (plus additional consecutive terms) remains the operative sentence. The 2019 entry imposing post-release control was vacated on appeal and the 2021 entry only notified him of post-release control for kidnapping, not resentencing.

The Appellate Division, Third Department denied Mary Elizabeth Rain's motion for reinstatement to the New York bar following a two-year suspension imposed in 2018 for multiple professional misconduct violations committed while she served as a district attorney. The court applied the three-part reinstatement test requiring compliance with suspension terms, proof of character and fitness by clear and convincing evidence, and demonstration that reinstatement would serve the public interest. The court found Rain failed to show she had meaningfully addressed the misconduct that led to suspension and provided no concrete plans or assurances that reinstatement would not harm the public, so her motion was denied.

The Texas Tenth Court of Appeals denied Bryan Stallworth's original petition for a writ of mandamus. The court issued a brief memorandum opinion stating only that the petition is denied and citing the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. No published reasoning or extended analysis accompanies the denial. The decision was delivered and filed on April 30, 2026, by Chief Justice Matt Johnson for a three-judge panel.

The Thirteenth Court of Appeals denied Reginald Callis’s pro se petition for a writ of mandamus challenging his conviction in a Jackson County trial-court case. The court held Callis failed to show entitlement to mandamus because he did not establish the trial court was required to perform a purely ministerial act and because he has an adequate alternative remedy under the exclusive post-conviction habeas procedure. The opinion cites precedent requiring a petitioner to meet both elements for mandamus and directs felony post-conviction complaints to Article 11.07 habeas relief.

The Court of Appeals denied Ernest Dale Benson Jr.'s personal restraint petition challenging the Department of Corrections’ recalculation of his earned release time (ERT). Benson was resentenced in 2024 from life without parole to two concurrent 40-year terms. DOC initially credited him with 33.33% ERT but later concluded aggravated first degree murder qualifies as a serious violent offense, limiting ERT to 15% under RCW 9.94A.729(3)(b). The court held aggravated first degree murder is a type of first degree murder within the statutory scheme, so Benson was eligible only for 15% ERT and failed to show unlawful restraint.

The Georgia Court of Appeals considered an Application for Discretionary Appeal filed by the father in a child-custody or juvenile case (LC No. 25JV0018) and denied the application on April 28, 2026. The order is brief and administrative: the court declined to exercise its discretionary review power and did not provide additional explanation or address the merits of the underlying juvenile-court proceedings. The denial leaves the lower-court action in place and does not create precedent on the substantive issues in the case.

The Ohio Eighth District Court of Appeals denied Latoya J. Yancy’s App.R. 26(B) application to reopen her direct criminal appeal. Yancy claimed appellate counsel was ineffective for not challenging various trial errors, including prosecutorial misconduct, failure to move to suppress, and failure to present mitigating evidence. The court found no record support that appellate counsel performed deficiently or that Yancy suffered prejudice; many issues had already been considered on direct appeal or lacked record evidence. Because the record did not show a colorable ineffective-assistance claim, the application to reopen was denied.