Court Filings

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s termination of spousal support. Patricia (wife) appealed after the Summit County trial court adopted a magistrate’s decision that ended Richard’s (husband) indefinite spousal support. The appellate court held the divorce decree only reserved the trial court authority to terminate support on death or the wife’s remarriage, and to modify support upon a substantial change in circumstances; it did not reserve authority to terminate support based on a change in circumstances. Because the termination exceeded the decree’s reserved powers, the trial court abused its discretion and the judgment was reversed.

The First District reversed a county court order that had dismissed a contractor’s suit to collect payment under an assignment of benefits (AOB) from an insurer for mold testing and remediation after Hurricane Sally. The court reviewed the AOB and a same-date invoice and concluded they satisfied Florida Statute § 627.7152’s written and itemized-per-unit estimate requirements. Because the documents, viewed together, described the services and costs sufficiently and there was no evidence of multiple dwelling units, the AOB was valid and the contractor may proceed with its claim on remand.

The Third District Court of Appeal reversed Eduardo Alfredo Medrano-Chavez’s convictions and sentences for sexual activity with a child by a person in familial or custodial authority and lewd and lascivious molestation, and remanded for a new trial. The court held the trial judge abused discretion by allowing a detective to testify that, based on his experience, the alleged victim’s demeanor in an out-of-court interview seemed “genuine,” which impermissibly bolstered her credibility. Because the victim’s credibility was central and there was no physical corroboration, the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error was harmless.

The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed a trial court order that vacated a default and dismissed Wells Fargo’s complaint against Rio Poco Homeowners’ Association. The trial court had relied on materials outside the complaint to find Wells Fargo failed to comply with Florida’s presuit mediation service requirements under section 720.311, but the appellate court held dismissal was improper because Wells Fargo pleaded that all conditions precedent had been performed or waived and the complaint’s allegations of waiver were not contradicted by the complaint’s four corners. The case is remanded for further proceedings.

The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed a circuit court order that awarded the father attorney’s fees as sanctions against the mother in a paternity case. The trial court granted the mother’s counsel leave to withdraw and conditioned a continuance on the mother paying the father’s fees for attending the hearing. The appellate court held the mother was not given notice that sanctions would be considered nor an opportunity to present evidence, violating due process, and therefore the sanctions award must be reversed. Because that reversal resolves the main issue, the court did not reach the remaining arguments.

The Appellate Division, First Department reversed a lower court order and granted defendants' motions to dismiss plaintiff Cortlandt Street Recovery Corp.'s amended complaint in its entirety. The plaintiff alleged fraud and breach of contract based on an Offering Memorandum's statements about how subordinated notes' proceeds and certain equity instruments (CPECs/PECs) would be used or secured. The court found the Offering Memorandum did not contain actionable misrepresentations and that no contractual provision prohibited redemption of the cited equity instruments, so fraud and breach claims failed as a matter of law.

The Appellate Division, First Department reversed Supreme Court and granted summary judgment to Chutes and Compactors, dismissing 267 Development LLC's second third-party complaint. The building owner (267 Development) sought contractual indemnification, common-law indemnity and contribution, and insurance-failure damages from Chutes after a porter was injured by glass near a compactor. The court held Chutes' contractual obligations had ended long before the accident, there was no evidence Chutes had been negligent in failing to warn about or create the missing safety cover, and the owner abandoned its insurance claim by not opposing that part of the motion.

The Appellate Division, First Department reversed Supreme Court's dismissal and reinstated plaintiff Forrester's discrimination claims against 640 Park Avenue Corporation and Brown Harris Stevens Residential Management, LLC. The court held that under notice pleading the complaint sufficiently alleges that the co-op owner and managing agent were involved in defendant Tichenor's decision not to sell his unit to plaintiff — a qualified Black woman and nurse practitioner — who was later bypassed in favor of a white male board member. The court found the pleadings, including allegations about the managing agent's communications and the board member's last-minute purchase, adequate to raise an inference of discrimination and warrant discovery.

The Appellate Division reversed the lower court's denial of defendant accounting firm EFP Rotenberg's summary judgment motion and granted dismissal of plaintiff Rubin's amended complaint. Rubin alleged he relied on EFP's audits and verbal statements to invest $300,000 in Continuity X, but the court found no admissible evidence of reasonable reliance: the challenged 2012 audit was finalized after Rubin invested, his deposition contradicted later affidavit claims about seeing draft workpapers, the oral assurances were insufficient to establish accountant liability to a third party, and earlier unaudited or 2011 reports did not show the $11 million receivable he cited. The dismissal was therefore proper.

The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment and directed the trial court to vacate its denial of pretrial mental health diversion for Vincent Tourville, who pleaded no contest to felony corporal injury to a spouse after the trial court refused diversion but offered probation with the same treatment. The appellate court held that once a defendant is found eligible and suitable for diversion and does not pose an unreasonable risk of committing a statutory “super strike,” forcing a plea to obtain identical community treatment contradicts the statute’s purpose to treat mental disorders outside the criminal system. The court found the trial court abused its discretion by denying diversion based on public- and victim-safety concerns despite having found Tourville did not pose an unreasonable risk under the statute.

The Appellate Division reversed the Family Part's May 19, 2025 order that dismissed a temporary restraining order and denied a final restraining order (FRO) after a college student (plaintiff) proved defendant committed an acquaintance rape that included manual strangulation. The trial court credited the victim but denied an FRO based largely on lack of prior domestic violence between the parties and instead admonished the defendant informally. The appellate court held that the extreme physical force—sexual assault plus strangulation—was sufficiently egregious to require an FRO and that the court improperly downplayed the victim's best interests and the risk of future abuse.

The Ninth District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of summary judgment to three Medina police officers and remanded for further proceedings. The officers had been sued personally after entering Renee Johnson’s apartment following a disturbance report and concerns about Johnson’s mental health; the trial court denied immunity and applied a four-year statute of limitations. The appellate court held the trial court failed to analyze immunity under R.C. 2744.03(A)(6) separately for each officer and provided no reasoning on whether exceptions to immunity applied, so the matter is reversed and remanded for the trial court to make the required, officer-specific immunity findings.

The Washington Court of Appeals reversed dismissal of a putative class action by state employees Jeanette Simonton and Ryan Kelso after the Health Care Authority (HCA) denied coverage for prescription drugs to treat obesity under the Uniform Medical Plan (UMP). The court held that an agency regulation describing essential health benefit minimums does not automatically permit excluding obesity drugs or resolve whether that exclusion is discriminatory under the state nondiscrimination statute RCW 48.43.0128. The court ruled plaintiffs may pursue discovery to try to prove the exclusion was discriminatory rather than based on legitimate medical-management or medical-necessity reasons.

The California Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal and held that Penal Code section 189(e)(2) requires proof that a nonkiller who acted with an intent to kill aided or assisted the actual killer in the lethal act itself, not merely in the underlying felony. Morris sought resentencing under section 1172.6 after Senate Bill 1437 narrowed felony-murder liability; the record showed he had intent to kill but did not establish whether he fired the fatal shot. Because the statute’s phrase requires aiding the actual killer in the commission of murder, the matter is remanded for reconsideration under that standard.

The Ninth District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's denial of summary judgment to three Medina police officers and remanded for further proceedings. The officers had been sued by Renee Johnson after they entered her apartment following a disturbance call and reports that Johnson might harm herself. The appeals court held the trial court failed to analyze statutory immunity under R.C. 2744.03(A)(6) as to each officer individually and did not explain why exceptions to immunity applied. Because the trial court gave no immunity analysis, the appeals court reversed and remanded for proper findings.

The Eleventh District Court of Appeals reversed the Trumbull County Common Pleas Court's denial of Danny L. Isom’s petition for postconviction relief because the trial court failed to provide required findings of fact and conclusions of law. Isom had been convicted of felonious assault with a firearm specification, sentenced, and his direct appeal was affirmed. The appellate court held that Ohio law (R.C. 2953.21(D)) requires a trial court to file findings and conclusions when dismissing a postconviction petition, and the absence of those findings requires reversal and remand for the trial court to comply.

The Georgia Court of Appeals reversed a trial-court order denying motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction in a fraud case. International Ventures sued Waldon, Danielle Fenster, and Christopher and Laura Ritter for allegedly defrauding it of more than $1 million. The trial court relied in part on Waldon’s default to impute his in-state acts to the other defendants under a conspiracy theory of jurisdiction. The appellate court held Ventures offered only unverified allegations and no evidence rebutting defendants’ affidavits showing no Georgia contacts, so jurisdiction over the nonresident defendants was not established.

The Appellate Division reversed a trial court's sua sponte vacation of its own denial of reconsideration and the reinstatement of a previously granted summary judgment. Plaintiff Doglio sued under New Jersey's whistleblower law (CEPA), and the trial court had granted summary judgment for defendant Boasso, finding Doglio was an independent contractor. After denying plaintiff's timely motion for reconsideration, the trial court, without notice, vacated that denial and rescinded its own summary-judgment ruling. The appellate court held the trial court lacked authority to sua sponte reconsider a final order denying reconsideration under Rule 4:49-2, reinstated the original final orders, and emphasized finality and the non-enlargeable 20-day reconsideration window.

The Court of Appeal reversed a trial court grant of summary judgment for the California Franchise Tax Board in a tax-refund suit by Texas radiologist Xavier Garcia-Rojas. The trial court had concluded Garcia-Rojas operated a unitary sole proprietorship and thus was taxable under a California regulation allocating income of unitary businesses. The appellate court held the Board failed to prove as a matter of law that a sole proprietor engaged in a single business activity is a unitary business; the Board cited no controlling authority applying the unitary theory to a single-person sole proprietorship. The case is remanded for further proceedings.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department reversed a Family Court order that had required petitioner Tamra J. Werner to pay respondent Kraig H. Kenney $18,000 in legal fees and expenses and to pay a $250 fine. The appeal challenged a December 17, 2024 Family Court decision in a proceeding under Family Court Act article 6. The appellate court unanimously found error in law and vacated both the monetary award and the fine, remanding nothing and awarding no costs.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department reversed Family Court's dismissal of a mother's petition to relocate to Arkansas with her child. The court found new information — the mother married a fiancé who lives in Arkansas and the father had not exercised visitation for 16 months — made the existing record insufficient to decide the child's best interests. The appellate court reinstated the mother's petition and remitted the case to Family Court for an expedited hearing and a fresh best-interests determination.

The Appellate Division reversed a Surrogate's Court decree in a trust settlement case. HSBC, as trustee, sought final settlement and construction of a 1934 trust created by Marjorie Knox Campbell, which terminated in April 2023 upon the death of the last measuring life. Surrogate's Court had divided the remainder into three equal family shares and then distributed each share among the deceased child's children. The appellate court held the trust language unambiguous and directed a per stirpes distribution from the first generation of surviving descendants — the ten grandchildren — resulting in each grandchild receiving an equal one-tenth share. The case was remitted for further proceedings consistent with that ruling.

The Appellate Division reversed a Family Court order that declared petitioners Mary B.L. and Robert A.L. to be the sole legal parents of two children born via surrogacy and ordered their immediate custody transfer. The court found both surrogacy agreements unenforceable under Family Court Act article 5-C (one unsigned by Robert; the other executed after embryo transfer), so the statute required the court to decide parentage based on party intent while also considering the children's best interests. Because Family Court refused a hearing and did not adequately consider best interests, the matter is sent back for an immediate hearing.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department reversed a Supreme Court order that had granted summary judgment to defendant Michael A. Taylor dismissing plaintiffs' negligence complaint after plaintiffs failed to timely oppose the motion. The appellate court found the trial court abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs' motion to vacate their default based on law-office failure, negligible delay, lack of willfulness, and no prejudice to defendant. The panel concluded plaintiffs offered a potentially meritorious opposition because issues of fact existed about whether defendant's speed was reasonable given limited visibility, and therefore reinstated the complaint against defendant.

The Court of Appeals reversed the common pleas court and ODPS (PISGS) and held that the agency improperly required separate 20-hour handgun certifications for revolvers and semiautomatic pistols. Charles Henry had completed OPOTC-approved handgun training and requalification using a semiautomatic handgun but was denied a revolver notation on his firearm bearer identification card because ODPS relied on administrative rules and internal practice requiring a separate revolver certificate. The appellate court concluded the statute (R.C. 4749.10) requires 20 hours "in handgun use" generally, and does not authorize ODPS to impose additional 20-hour requirements for each handgun subtype.

The Illinois Appellate Court reversed the trial court’s order that had allowed Michael and Amanda Mufarreh to obtain the identity of an anonymous YouTube user (John Doe) via pre-suit discovery under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 224. The petitioners alleged the user posted a video of their 10-year-old son’s emotional outburst and sought to sue for defamation, right-of-publicity, and intentional infliction of emotional distress; only the son’s emotional-distress claim survived below. The appellate court held the petition failed the heightened pleading standard for intentional infliction of emotional distress and therefore did not justify pre-suit discovery, so the discovery order was reversed.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of Dawon’s motion to dismiss and to compel arbitration in a construction-payment dispute. The parties had a detailed January 2024 service agreement that included a broad, surviving arbitration clause. In August 2024 they signed a short one-page follow-up agreement about cost handling and scheduling that did not address dispute resolution and did not supplant the original contract. The appellate court held the second agreement did not supersede the first, so the original arbitration clause remained enforceable and dismissal and arbitration were required.

The Texas Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s temporary injunction that had blocked the Texas Department of State Health Services from treating manufactured delta-8 THC products as Schedule I controlled substances. The Department and its commissioner had amended Schedule I definitions after objecting to a federal rule; the Court held those amendments were within the commissioner’s broad, statutorily granted discretion and did not conflict unambiguously with the 2019 Texas Farm Bill. The Court also held the Administrative Procedure Act did not govern publication of schedule changes, and that sovereign immunity bars the vendors’ claims.

The Texas Supreme Court held that when a party uses the pretrial affidavit process in Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 18.001 to prove medical expenses, only those specific items or charges that are actually controverted by a compliant counteraffidavit lose the statute’s evidentiary effect. Unchallenged portions of an initial affidavit remain competent evidence and may be submitted to the factfinder. The court reversed the court of appeals and remanded because the trial court erred by excluding entire medical-cost affidavits and counteraffidavits even though only portions were controverted, which deprived the claimant of admissible evidence of certain medical expenses.

The Sixth District Court of Appeal reversed a trial court order that denied Angel Daniel Caraballo’s Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a) motion challenging the form of his life sentences. The court agreed with the State that the judgments were defective because they failed to state Caraballo’s parole eligibility. The panel remanded with instructions that the trial court amend both life sentences to specify parole eligibility after the 25-year mandatory minimum. The amendments are ministerial and do not require Caraballo’s presence.