Court Filings

The Florida First District Court of Appeal dismissed Shirley Mears Davis's original petition for a writ of prohibition. The court held that the petition could not proceed because a criminal defendant generally may not proceed pro se while represented by counsel, citing Logan v. State. The dismissal was per curiam, with concurrence from the three judges, and the opinion notes the decision is not final until any timely motion under the appellate rules is resolved.

The Florida First District Court of Appeal dismissed Michael Ruiz’s petition for a writ of certiorari against the Florida Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate because the petition was filed after the deadline. The court relied on its prior decision in Adams v. Florida Unemployment Appeals Commission to support dismissal for untimeliness. The opinion is per curiam and unanimous, and it notes the judgment is not final until any timely motion under the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure is resolved.

The First District Court of Appeal dismissed Timothy A. Parker's appeal as moot. Parker sought relief (jail credit against a sentence) but completed the sentence while the appeal was pending, so there is no longer a live controversy for the court to resolve. The panel cited Toomer v. State, which holds that an appeal seeking jail credit may be dismissed as moot when the sentence is fully served during the appeal. The dismissal was per curiam and the opinion was not final until any timely motion under Florida appellate rules is resolved.

The State appealed an order suppressing evidence obtained after a traffic stop of Christopher Brady, who was facing a violation-of-probation proceeding. The Second District concluded it lacked jurisdiction because the trial court suppressed evidence but did not dismiss the affidavit charging the violation of probation, and orders suppressing evidence in a probation-revocation context are nonfinal and not appealable under the rules cited. The court dismissed the appeal, explaining that suppression in a violation-of-probation proceeding is not a suppression "before trial" subject to interlocutory State appeal and that judicial labor remains because the affidavit was not dismissed.

The Third District Court of Appeal dismissed J.L.'s petition for writ of certiorari challenging the trial court’s denial of his pretrial motion in limine to exclude certain records. The appellate court concluded it lacked jurisdiction because the petitioner did not show irreparable harm that could not be remedied on appeal from a final judgment. The court relied on precedent holding that rulings on motions in limine that exclude or admit evidence ordinarily can be corrected on direct appeal, so interlocutory certiorari review is inappropriate absent a showing of irreparable harm.

The appellate court reviewed portions of a circuit court order in a trust dispute between the parents (appellants) and the trustee (appellee) over expenditures for a disabled adult beneficiary. The court dismissed the appeal insofar as the parents sought review of compensation for their caregiving because the trial court’s order showed judicial labor on that issue had not concluded. For the remaining issues, the court affirmed the trial court’s rulings: sale of a residential condominium, reimbursement for a truck purchase, the parties’ agreement to use a “Dynamic Dividend Strategy” (but not a specific implementation option), and the sale of an office condominium did not violate due process.

The Appellate Division, First Department, reviewed a Family Court order entered after the mother defaulted at a fact-finding hearing in a neglect proceeding concerning her child. Because the mother's attorney, after consulting with the absent mother, declined to contest the allegations at the final hearing, the court held that no appeal lies from an order entered on default and dismissed the appeal of the neglect finding. The court nevertheless reviewed and affirmed the denial of the mother's request for an adjournment, finding no abuse of discretion given the repeated prior adjournments, adequate notice, and the mother's choice to travel instead of attending the hearing.

The Appellate Division dismissed Amira Lebda’s appeal from a Supreme Court order that denied her CPLR article 78 petition seeking grade changes and reinstatement at Touro College School of Education. The court unanimously dismissed the appeal for failure to perfect the record on appeal because petitioner did not include her underlying complaint to the New York State Division of Human Rights or the DHR determination that formed the basis of the Article 78 proceeding. The court explained that without those materials meaningful appellate review was impossible and therefore declined to reach the merits.

The court dismissed Toledo Hospital’s petition for a writ of prohibition seeking to stop Judge Lori Olender from presiding over a wrongful-death suit filed by the Estate of Yvonne Diller. The hospital argued the common pleas court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the allegedly negligent physician was a state employee and claims against state employees belong in the Court of Claims. The appellate court held R.C. 2743.02 divests jurisdiction over claims against the State but does not strip common pleas courts of jurisdiction over claims against private entities like Toledo Hospital, so the judge did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction. The hospital has an adequate remedy by appeal, so the writ was denied and the petition dismissed.

The Appellate Division, First Department, issued an order withdrawing the appeal in Stafford v. Nacson based on a stipulation between the parties dated January 5, 2026. The court noted the appeal was taken from a January 23, 2025 Supreme Court order and, after argument and consideration, unanimously agreed to withdraw the appeal according to the stipulation. The court also recalled and vacated a prior motions order entered February 10, 2026. No substantive ruling on the merits was made.

The court dismissed Abdikadir Abukar’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the municipal court’s March 25, 2025 sentencing entry did not satisfy the requirements for a final, appealable criminal judgment. Although a March 21, 2025 entry recorded the jury verdict and identified the offense and statute, the March 25 sentencing entry failed to state the fact of conviction (the name of the offense and statute) as required by Crim.R. 32(C). Because a single journalized entry must contain the required elements to create a final order, the court could not reach the assigned errors and dismissed the appeal as premature.

The Tenth District Court of Appeals denied Ramone Wright’s request for a writ of mandamus seeking reversal of an indictment in Franklin County Common Pleas case No. 09CR-3758. The court adopted the magistrate’s decision and granted the municipal court respondent’s motion to dismiss under Civ.R. 12(B)(6). The dismissal was based on procedural defects: Wright failed to submit a notarized affidavit of prior civil filings as required by R.C. 2969.25(A) and the affidavit he did file omitted multiple civil actions and appeals from the prior five years. Because compliance with R.C. 2969.25 is mandatory, the petition was dismissed without reaching the merits.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, per curiam, entered an order on May 5, 2026 quashing the appellant Michael E. Keeling’s notice of appeal. The court cited Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 910(a)(5) concerning the court’s consideration of issues limited to those set forth in the statement of questions presented. The order is short and disposes of the appeal by dismissing the procedural vehicle rather than reaching the merits.

The Court of Appeals dismissed an appeal by Chakina Patton from a Clayton County Probate Court order in her petition to be declared sole heir of her deceased father. The probate court had found Chakina to be an heir but expressly left several matters unresolved — including a competing paternity claim by Aneki Floyd, a motion for disbursement, and a potential permanent administration petition — and entered a judgment against Chakina for dissipating estate property. Because the probate court's order was not final, Chakina needed to pursue interlocutory appeal procedures (including a certificate of immediate review) and failed to do so, depriving this Court of jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Jennifer Daugherty’s direct appeal of a trial court contempt order against Matthew Woodard for failure to follow the required discretionary-appeal procedure for domestic relations matters. The appellate court explained that orders holding or declining to hold someone in contempt in a domestic relations case must be reviewed by application for discretionary appeal under OCGA § 5-6-35, and that compliance with that procedure is jurisdictional. Because Daugherty filed a direct appeal instead of an application for discretionary appeal, the Court of Appeals concluded it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal.

The Florida First District Court of Appeal dismissed William Fountain Jr.'s petition for a writ of belated appeal. The court issued a brief per curiam order on May 5, 2026, concluding the petition did not warrant relief. No opinion explaining the reasoning was provided, and the dismissal is subject to any timely rule-based motions for rehearing or other authorized post-decision filings.

The Court of Appeals dismissed David Ingle’s application for interlocutory review of the trial court’s February 26, 2026 order because the trial court’s certificate of immediate review was issued 41 days after entry of the underlying order, far beyond the ten-day statutory deadline. The court explained that the ten-day period begins on the entry of the order (when it is filed with the clerk), not on later service, so delayed service does not extend the deadline. The court noted the trial court could vacate and reinstate the order and certificate to allow another interlocutory appeal opportunity.

The Florida First District Court of Appeal dismissed Caleah Potter’s petition for a writ of certiorari. The petition was filed as an original proceeding seeking relief against the State of Florida, but the court’s one-line per curiam disposition simply states: DISMISSED. No published opinion, reasoning, or merits discussion appears; the dismissal ends this court’s review of the petition unless the petitioner timely files an authorized motion under Florida appellate rules.

The First District Court of Appeal dismissed Shamar Christian’s petition for a writ of certiorari directed at the State of Florida. The opinion is per curiam and contains no published reasoning; the court simply entered an order dismissing the original proceeding. Judges Rowe, Kelsey, and M.K. Thomas concurred. The clerk’s slip notes that the judgment is not final until potential timely motions under Florida appellate rules are resolved.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Vincent A. West’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. West pleaded guilty in 2019 and sought leave to file an out-of-time appeal; the trial court denied that request on January 23, 2026. West filed a notice of appeal on February 25, 2026, which was 33 days after the trial court’s order. Because Georgia law requires a notice of appeal within 30 days, the appellate court concluded it had no jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal.

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed Maurice Dewayne Conner’s appeal from the trial court’s denial of his amended motion for a new trial because the notice of appeal was untimely. Conner was convicted and sentenced in 2014, but did not file a motion for new trial within the 30-day statutory window; his motion filed in March 2025 was over ten years late. Because an untimely motion for new trial does not extend the deadline to file a notice of appeal, the Court concluded it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal.

Relator Heather Hill sought a writ of mandamus to compel Ohio Secretary of State Frank LaRose to accept her replacement lieutenant-governor candidate after her running mate withdrew 13 days before the May 5, 2026 primary. The court dismissed the mandamus claim because R.C. 3513.311(C) expressly permits replacement only when the lieutenant-governor candidate dies within the specified window, not when the candidate withdraws. The court also dismissed Hill’s requests for a declaratory judgment and a prohibitory injunction for lack of this court’s original jurisdiction over those remedies. Hill’s emergency motion was denied.

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed Phillip Hugh Wright's appeal for failure to comply with court rules requiring filing an enumeration of errors and an appellate brief. The appellant did not respond to the Court's notice of docketing or its specific order to file those documents by April 24, 2026. Because the required materials remain unfiled, the court deemed the appeal abandoned and entered an order of dismissal under its procedural rules.

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed Ergin Tek's appeal from Holly Park Square Apartments, LLC because the appellant failed to comply with the court's docketing notice and Court of Appeals Rule 23(a) by not filing an enumeration of errors and brief within the required time. The court had ordered those filings by May 1, 2026; they were not filed by the May 4, 2026 order date. Citing Court of Appeals Rules 7 and 23(a) (and Rule 13), the court deemed the appeal abandoned and ordered dismissal.

The Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed Milan Macek’s direct appeal from the trial court’s denial of his verified petition for a stalking protective order against his ex-wife. The court explained that although appeals from stalking orders ordinarily may be direct, this case arises from alleged family violence between former spouses and therefore falls within domestic relations matters. Appeals in such Family Violence Act cases must proceed by discretionary application under OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(2). Because Macek did not follow the discretionary-appeal procedure, the Court of Appeals concluded it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal.

The City of Atlanta, successor to a judgment creditor, appealed after the trial court vacated a default garnishment judgment against Popmenu, Inc., concluding Popmenu had not been properly served. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal because appeals in garnishment cases must be pursued by discretionary-appeal application under OCGA § 5-6-35, and the City failed to follow that jurisdictional procedure. Because compliance with the discretionary-appeal process is jurisdictional, the appellate court lacked authority to decide the merits and granted Popmenu’s motion to dismiss the appeal.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Dwayne Cotton’s application for discretionary review seeking permission to pursue an out-of-time appeal. Cotton previously pleaded guilty and litigated a motion for an out-of-time appeal; this Court had earlier held the trial court should have dismissed (not denied) Cotton’s motion under Cook v. State, and the trial court later dismissed the motion. Cotton now sought relief in this Court under OCGA § 5-6-39.1, but the Court held the statute and Cook do not permit direct review here because he did not first move in the trial court for leave to file an out-of-time appeal. The application was therefore dismissed, with the court noting Cotton may file a motion in superior court by June 30, 2026.

The Appellate Division dismissed as moot an appeal by petitioner Markeef Royal challenging a Monroe County Court judgment (denominated order) that denied his habeas corpus petition. The court noted the appeal was moot in light of a recent Fourth Department decision in People v Royal (Apr. 24, 2026) and therefore unanimously dismissed the appeal without costs. No further factual or legal discussion appears in this short order beyond the dismissal as moot.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department dismissed plaintiff Monfort's appeal of a Supreme Court decision because the document appealed from was a non-appealable decision rather than an appealable order. Plaintiff sought review of the portion of the paper that granted summary judgment dismissing his negligent supervision claim under the Child Victims Act. The appellate panel concluded the paper, though labeled "Decision and Order," did not meet statutory requirements for an order and did not actually order anything, so there was no appealable instrument and the appeal was dismissed.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department dismissed the father's appeal from a Family Court order that modified a prior custody arrangement and set parenting time. The court concluded the father had received the substantive relief he sought—including the equal parenting time requested—so he was not an aggrieved party and therefore lacked appellate standing. Because the appeal raised no reviewable grievance, the court unanimously dismissed the appeal without costs.