Court Filings

The Appellate Division, First Department reversed a lower court dismissal and partially granted a CPLR 7803(3) petition by NYPD sergeants who challenged DCAS determinations that their promotional exam answers not be scored because they used cell phones before being dismissed. The court found the agency's application of an ambiguous test-taking rule — forbidding cell phone use “before, during and after” the test — to be irrational, especially given uncertainty about when the exam ended and inconsistent agency statements about the rule’s scope. The case is remanded to Supreme Court for further proceedings, with the aspects of the determinations vacated and respondents ordered to answer petitioners’ requests for relief.

The Court of Appeals considered a direct appeal by Carlos Hernandez from the White County Probate Court dismissing his claim against the Estate of Mary Catherine Bonner and denying his petition alleging administrator misconduct. The court held that because White County's population (28,003 in 2020) is below the statutory 90,000 threshold, the statutory right of direct appeal from a probate court to an appellate court does not apply. The filing is treated as a civil case filed in the wrong forum and is remanded to the probate court with directions to transmit the matter to the White County Superior Court for further proceedings.

The Appellate Division held the case and remitted Villalba v. City of Auburn to Supreme Court, Cayuga County, because the trial court resolved non-jurisdictional issues before first determining whether the City was properly served. Plaintiff sued the City and officers for negligence, negligent training, and excessive force arising from a traffic stop. The appellate court directed that the lower court must first hold a traverse hearing to resolve the service/jurisdiction question and only then rule on the City’s other motion arguments.

The Appellate Division held that the trial court should have first held a traverse hearing to resolve whether the City of Auburn was properly served before deciding the City's motion to dismiss on other grounds. Plaintiff sued the City and officers for negligence and excessive force after an alleged assault during a traffic stop. Supreme Court reserved the service issue but denied other aspects of the motion; the appellate court stayed further decision, remanded the case for a traverse hearing, and directed the trial court to decide the jurisdictional question first and then rule on the remaining motion grounds.

The Fourth Court of Appeals reviewed a remand judgment in a medical-malpractice case after the Texas Supreme Court directed corrections: apply a settlement credit and structure periodic payments for future medical expenses. The appeals court concluded the trial court misallocated the lump-sum portion of the judgment by overstating attorney’s fees and certain interim medical costs but otherwise complied with the Supreme Court’s instructions and statutory law. The court suggested a remittitur of $533,038.51 to cure the error and affirmed the judgment as modified if the remittitur is timely filed; otherwise it will reverse and remand.

The Court of Appeals denied the defendant's fifth motion for extension to file an appellate brief, abated the appeal, and remanded the case to the trial court for a hearing under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.8(b). The trial court must determine whether the appellant wants to continue the appeal and whether his counsel has abandoned the appeal, make written findings and recommendations, appoint substitute counsel if necessary, transcribe the hearing, and forward supplemental clerk’s and reporter’s records to the Court of Appeals by June 1, 2026. The court denied further extension and ordered the procedures to protect the appellant's right to counsel on appeal.

The Court of Appeals reversed the Court of Claims and remanded for further proceedings in a public-records dispute. Michael Newman sought 13 categories of records from the Greater Columbus Arts Council (GCAC) and its Film Columbus division. The Court of Claims had granted disclosure for three financial items under R.C. 149.431 but denied the rest after finding GCAC was not the functional equivalent of a public office under the Public Records Act. The appellate court held the lower court failed to adequately weigh the totality of the Oriana House factors (especially government involvement) and remanded for a fuller functional-equivalency analysis, while affirming the ruling on annual reports as non-R.C. 149.431 records.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court justice in this concurring and dissenting opinion would reverse the Commonwealth Court’s ruling that West Chester Borough’s stormwater ‘‘stream protection fee’’ is a tax exempting the Pennsylvania State System of Higher Education (West Chester University). The justice reasons the University voluntarily uses the Borough stormwater system, receives a discrete benefit from that use, and therefore could be required to pay a fee rather than be immune as a sovereign entity. Because the Commonwealth Court did not analyze whether the charge is proportional to the benefit received, the justice would remand for further factual development on proportionality.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court vacated part of the Commonwealth Court's order that had sustained a preliminary objection to Christopher Rogalski's request for a writ of mandamus to remove disciplinary information from Department of Education websites. The Supreme Court directed the Commonwealth Court to reconsider that preliminary objection in light of its recent decision in T.G.A. v. Department of Education, 348 A.3d 1043 (Pa. 2025). All other parts of the Commonwealth Court's order were affirmed, and jurisdiction over the case was relinquished.

The Appellate Division, Third Department reversed County Court's denial of defendant Cendno Rahaman's CPL 440.10 motion and granted relief in the interest of justice. Rahaman argued his trial lawyer was ineffective for failing to object to empaneling an anonymous jury. The court found the sworn allegations and counsel's affidavit showed a legal basis that could not be summarily rejected as successive, and that empaneling an anonymous jury without a factual predicate can deny a fair trial. The matter is remitted to County Court for a new trial.

The Appellate Division reversed a County Court order that denied defendant Shannon Dickinson's CPL 440.10 motion to vacate his conviction, and remitted the matter to a different County Court judge for further proceedings. The court concluded that the judge who decided the 440 motion had a law clerk who previously worked as an assistant prosecutor on the underlying case and that the clerk's potential prior involvement — combined with the failure to disclose or insulate the clerk — created an appearance of impropriety. Because the record does not show the clerk's role on the motion, the court found reversal and reassignment appropriate in the interest of justice.

The Appellate Division, Third Department reversed part of a Court of Claims judgment and held that the State can be liable for the alleged rectal intrusion by correction officers. Claimant had been allowed to file a late claim for assault and battery but the Court of Claims declined to consider sexualized conduct under the law of the case. This Court found that the law of the case did not bind it and that the alleged rectal intrusion was sufficiently connected to officers' duties to survive the late‑claim screening and to support vicarious liability. The case is remitted for recalculation of damages.

The Appellate Division reversed part of a Supreme Court judgment in a proceeding to confirm a master arbitration award where Integrated Specialty ASC, LLC sought no-fault benefits and attorneys' fees. The court held the trial court erred by awarding only $1,000 under the no-fault fee regulation and by failing to award additional fees for the CPLR article 75 confirmation proceeding. The appellate court awarded the regulatory maximum fee of $1,360 and remanded for the trial court to determine the amount of additional attorneys' fees under 11 NYCRR 65-4.10(j)(4) and then enter an amended judgment.

The Appellate Division reviewed a mortgage foreclosure where defendant Cheryl Hunte defaulted and a referee's report and judgment of foreclosure and sale were entered. The court dismissed Hunte's direct appeal from an interim order as moot but reversed the foreclosure judgment insofar as it depended on presumed valid service of process. Because Hunte submitted a sworn denial with supporting facts sufficient to rebut the process server's affidavit, the court remitted the case for a hearing to determine whether she was properly served, and ordered a new determination afterward on confirmation of the referee's report and the motion to vacate the earlier default judgment.

The Court of Appeals considered Eric Maxwell's direct appeal from the trial court's denial of his motion for an out-of-time appeal following convictions that included malice murder. The court concluded it lacked jurisdiction because Georgia's Supreme Court has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over cases in which the death penalty could be imposed. Because malice murder carries a potential death sentence, the Court of Appeals transferred the appeal to the Supreme Court of Georgia for disposition.

The Illinois Appellate Court (Third District) answered two certified questions about the Biometric Information Privacy Act exemption for government contractors. The court held that the exemption does not require a contractor to work exclusively for a state agency or local government. However, the exemption applies only when the contractor’s challenged conduct occurred within the scope of the contractor’s governmental work—i.e., when the contractor was acting as a contractor for the government. The court therefore rejected a purely temporal reading that would exempt all conduct during the existence of a government contract.

The First Department reviewed a motion in a class-action landlord-tenant case where defendants sought disqualification of plaintiffs' counsel for an alleged conflict arising from counsel's prior representation of several former building owners. The appellate court held that the trial court erred in finding defendants had waived the conflict claim, and concluded the record was incomplete to decide disqualification. The court therefore ordered plaintiffs' counsel to produce itemized files related to the prior representation so defendants can assess whether an actual conflict exists, and otherwise affirmed the lower court's denial of immediate disqualification and dismissal.

The Court of Appeals (Seventh District) ordered the appeal of Cody Lee Cochran abated and the case remanded because the reporter's record lacks three State exhibits (22, 23, 24) that are encrypted by the FBI and unreadable without special software. The court directed the trial court to obtain accessible, reviewable copies of those exhibits and to have the court reporter file them with the appellate clerk by May 28, 2026. If the State cannot provide usable copies, the trial court must hold a hearing under the appellate rule to determine whether the exhibits are functionally lost or destroyed and make written findings for the supplemental record.

The Texas Supreme Court granted review in two consolidated petitions challenging a court of appeals judgment about ownership of an oil-and-gas royalty created by a 1933 deed. The high court held the court of appeals erred to conclude it lacked jurisdiction to consider the presumed-grant doctrine because that issue was fairly included in the interlocutory appeal. The Court vacated the court of appeals’ merits judgment, reversed its jurisdictional ruling, and remanded the case for the court of appeals to consider both deed text (double-fraction) and the presumed-grant doctrine without expressing a view on the ultimate ownership outcome.

The Illinois Appellate Court (3rd District) answered a certified question about whether a litigant granted a full fee waiver under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 298 is also entitled to a waiver of court reporter transcript costs. The court held that Rule 298 incorporates the waiver terms of 735 ILCS 5/5-105(a)(1), and following the Second District’s reasoning in In re Marriage of Main, concluded that transcript costs necessary for an appeal fall within the waivable "fees, costs, and charges." The case is remanded for the trial court to identify which transcripts are necessary and to provide them to the appellant without charge.

The Appellate Division affirmed most of defendant Tahnisha Joyner-Pounds's convictions for three counts of aggravated driving while intoxicated and one count of driving while intoxicated, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency and weight of the evidence that she was intoxicated and that the three children in the car were 15 or younger. The court found some preservation issues but concluded the record allowed reasonable inferences as to the children's ages and that officer observations supported the intoxication verdict. However, the court reserved decision and remitted the case to Supreme Court to reconsider a CPL 30.30 speedy-trial dismissal motion tied to alleged discovery violations, because the trial court denied the motion without allowing the People to respond.

The Appellate Division, Fourth Department, granted the defendant's motion to dismiss his appeal in People v Garrett and remitted the matter to Supreme Court, Erie County, with instructions to vacate the judgment of conviction and dismiss the indictment. The court cited People v Matteson as governing authority for the appropriate remedy. The decision is a brief memorandum and order resolving only the procedural motion to dismiss the appeal and directing the trial court to take further action consistent with precedent.

The Appellate Division reversed Family Court's dismissal of a mother's petition to modify a consent visitation order and remanded for further proceedings. The mother sought to change a consent order that granted joint custody with primary placement to the father and limited the mother to supervised agency visitation once per month and additional supervised visits “as agreed.” The appellate court found the mother proved a change in circumstances because the agency placement was effectively unavailable and the father refused to allow the agreed additional visitation, and held the case must proceed to a full hearing on whether modification would be in the children's best interests.

The Texas Supreme Court granted two petitions for review in competing claims over a 1933 deed that reserved an “undivided one-fourth of the usual one eighth” royalty. The court held the court of appeals erred in declining to address the presumed-grant doctrine on jurisdictional grounds, vacated the court of appeals’ merits decision, and remanded for reconsideration of both deed construction and the presumed-grant doctrine. The Court emphasized that the presumed-grant issue was fairly included in the permissive appeal and instructed the court of appeals to resolve both paths without expressing a view on the ultimate ownership outcome.

The Court of Appeal (First Appellate District, Div. Three) reviewed a challenge to probation condition no. 24, which allowed the probation department to jail a probationer for up to 120 days if he did not "successfully complete" residential treatment and denied credits for time in unsuccessful programs. Although Emrick’s probation was later terminated and he received the disputed custody credits, the court exercised discretion to decide the issues because they are recurring. The court held the condition impermissibly delegated core judicial authority to probation and was invalid for failing to reflect a knowing waiver of the statutory right to custody credits under Penal Code section 2900.5.

The Superior Court vacated and remanded the defendant Dwayne Eric Lee’s sentence because the trial court imposed no jail time for a conviction under 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1543(b)(1)(i). The Commonwealth appealed the sentence as illegal; the court interpreted the statutory phrase “shall be sentenced . . . to undergo imprisonment for a period of not less than 60 days nor more than 90 days” to require an indeterminate sentence with a mandatory 60-day minimum and a 90-day maximum. Because the trial court imposed zero days, the sentence was illegal and must be vacated for resentencing consistent with the statutory range.

The Georgia Court of Appeals granted the appellee's motion to remand the case Downey Trees, Inc. v. Stephens to the State Court of Forsyth County. The clerk was ordered to remand the matter, and the order allows either party to file a new notice of appeal within 30 days after resolution of a pending motion to enforce settlement. The decision is procedural and simply returns the case to the state court for further proceedings rather than addressing the underlying merits.

The Appellate Division reversed a Family Court order that denied the mother's objections to two Support Magistrate orders. The Support Magistrate had ordered the father to pay spousal support and ordered the mother to pay child support, based on findings that included the father's approximately $161,000 income and an imputed income to the mother. The appellate court held the Family Court erred: the father's deferred income must be included in calculating combined income, and the Support Magistrate abused discretion by imputing income to the mother above her reported earnings. The case is remitted for recalculation and further proceedings.

The Appellate Division reversed a Supreme Court order that granted the mother sole legal and physical custody of the parties' child and directed the father to pay temporary child support arrears. The appellate court held the Supreme Court erred by deciding custody without a plenary hearing and without making specific findings about the child's best interests. The case is remitted for a hearing and a new determination; meanwhile, the custody provision of the August 8, 2022 order remains in effect pending that hearing. The child-support arrears directive was vacated pending further proceedings.

The Court of Appeal granted a peremptory writ directing the Contra Costa County Superior Court to vacate its minute order that denied a petition for mandate brought by four teachers challenging West Contra Costa Unified School District’s staffing practices. The trial court had denied the writ based on the District’s claim it was impossible to fully staff classrooms with credentialed teachers. The appellate court held the District failed to prove it had exhausted statutory procedures (including seeking waivers from state entities) before asserting impossibility, so the defense was premature and the denial of the writ was reversed for entry of an order denying the petition.